The illusion of motion: corporate (im)mobility and the failed promise of centros by Gerner-Beuerle, Carsten et al.
The illusion of motion: corporate (im)mobility and the failed promise of 
centros
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102300/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Gerner-Beuerle, Carsten, Mucciarelli, Federico, Schuster, Edmund and Siems, 
Mathias (2019) The illusion of motion: corporate (im)mobility and the failed 
promise of centros. European Business Organization Law Review, 20 (3). 425 - 
465. ISSN 1741-6205 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-019-00157-9
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) 
licence. This licence allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even 
commercially, as long as you credit the authors for the original work. More information 
and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
Vol.:(0123456789)
European Business Organization Law Review (2019) 20:425–465
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-019-00157-9
123
ARTICLE
The Illusion of Motion: Corporate (Im)Mobility 
and the Failed Promise of Centros
Carsten Gerner‑Beuerle1 · Federico Mucciarelli2,3 · Edmund Schuster4 · 
Mathias Siems5,6
Published online: 10 September 2019 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
The European Court of Justice’s landmark decision in Centros was heralded as cre-
ating the preconditions for a vibrant market for incorporations in the EU. In practice, 
however, today’s corporate landscape in Europe differs little from that of the late 
1990s. Very few large companies have made use of their ability to subject them-
selves to the company law of a Member State in which they are not also headquar-
tered, and there are few signs suggesting that a ‘European Delaware’ will emerge 
in the near future. To the extent that Member States have engaged in competitive 
law-making, this has largely been confined to minimum capital requirements and 
rules affecting the ease of the incorporation process—areas concerning primarily 
micro-companies. We argue that the modest effect of Centros is not only a function 
of limited economic incentives to engage in regulatory competition and regulatory 
arbitrage, but also of the fact that the applicability of large sections of relevant laws 
governing corporate behaviour is determined by real seat-like connecting factors 
which render regulatory arbitrage more difficult. We analyse the boundaries between 
the lex societatis and neighbouring legal areas, notably insolvency and tort law, 
and find that the body of rules regulating a company’s outward-facing activities, as 
opposed to its internal affairs, is largely removed from regulatory arbitrage. It there-
fore seems likely that the potential benefits of selecting the applicable company law, 
while remaining subject to a cocktail of other, equally relevant rules, are sufficiently 
small to be regularly outweighed by the costs of a complex and non-standard corpo-
rate structure that is necessary to exercise free movement rights.
Keywords Right of establishment · Centros · Corporate mobility · Regulatory 
competition · Lex societatis · Lex concursus
 * Carsten Gerner-Beuerle 
 c.gerner@ucl.ac.uk
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
426 C. Gerner-Beuerle et al.
123
1 Introduction
It has now been 20  years since the European Court of Justice delivered its land-
mark Centros decision,1 followed by a string of cases similarly supportive of corpo-
rate mobility.2 In theory, this line of cases has created significant opportunities for 
companies and entrepreneurs throughout the EU to engage in regulatory arbitrage 
in relation to the company law rules they are governed by. This could well have pre-
pared the ground for Union-wide regulatory competition between Member States. 
In practice, however, today’s corporate landscape in Europe differs little from that 
of the late 1990s. Very few large companies have in fact adopted structures under 
which the core corporate law rules they are governed by are supplied by a Mem-
ber State in which they are not headquartered,3 and both regulatory arbitrage by 
entrepreneurs and competitive law-making by Member States has largely been con-
fined to the areas of minimum capital requirements4 and the ease of incorporating 
(micro-)companies.
Fears of, or hopes for, the emergence of a European Delaware have thus been 
shown to be almost entirely unfounded, with corporate mobility and regulatory com-
petition in EU company law—for better or worse5—never having reached a point 
warranting comparisons to the experience in the United States.6 From this perspec-
tive, the effect of Centros on company law and company law-making in Europe was 
ultimately very modest.
There are several reasons for the differences between corporate mobility and 
the choice of law in Europe and the US. One is rooted in economics: the economic 
incentives for EU Member States to engage in regulatory competition are very dif-
ferent from those in the US, where attracting incorporations (historically New Jersey 
and Delaware, more recently also Nevada) offers more direct and obvious financial 
advantages.7
Without disputing the importance of these incentives as an explanatory factor, 
this article will argue that the structure and interplay between supranational EU law 
and national law, in particular an idiosyncratic combination of primary EU law, con-
flict of law rules, and national corporate, insolvency, tort law and other legal areas, 
has contributed significantly to the generally muted response to Centros by both 
1 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459.
2 See in particular Case C-208/00 Überseering [2002] ECR I-9919; Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koop-
handel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. [2003] ECR I-10155; Case C-411/03 SEVIC 
Systems AG v. Amtsgericht Neuwied [2005] ECR I-10805; Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktato es Szolgaltato 
bt [2008] ECR I-9641; Case C-378/10 VALE Építési kft, ECLI:EU:C:2012:440.
3 For variations between Member States see Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2018a).
4 See e.g. Gelter (2005); Ringe (2013).
5 We do not offer an opinion on the merits and demerits of regulatory competition and the related debate 
about a race to the top or bottom in the United States. The classic exposition of the ‘race to the bottom’ 
view is Cary (1974), and the most influential response is Winter (1977).
6 For an early accurate prediction of this outcome, see e.g. Enriques (2004). For recent evidence of a 
lack of regulatory competition, see e.g. Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2019), Part 1, paras. 90–93.
7 On the limited importance of (hypothetical) franchise tax revenues and revenues from legal and finan-
cial services in the EU, see Gelter (2005), pp 259–262.
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companies and Member States. The extraordinary attention that the Court of Jus-
tice’s quintuplet Centros, Überseering, Inspire Art, Cartesio and VALE has received 
from legal commentators has arguably distracted from the fact that the degree of 
corporate mobility and regulatory competition is a function of a complex interaction 
of legal rules of different provenance operating at different levels.
It is worth remembering that Centros and its progeny merely require Member 
States to accept companies incorporated in other EU Member States establishing 
economic ties, including their strongest economic ties,8 in their territories, without 
calling into question the general applicability of the foreign company law in ques-
tion. Importantly, however, this case law does not delineate the exact scope of the 
foreign rules to be accepted by the host Member State, or place limits on the host 
state’s ability to enact non-company law requirements which fulfil purposes similar 
or have effects comparable to those of core company law rules. The ambiguity is 
perhaps clearest at the intersection of company law and insolvency law, but as will 
be shown below goes well beyond it.
In this article we argue that within the legal framework created by Centros, the 
potential benefits of corporate mobility as a way to select only corporate law rules, 
while remaining subject to a cocktail of other, equally relevant rules, are sufficiently 
small to be regularly outweighed by the direct and indirect costs that a complex and 
non-standard legal structure inevitably entails. Moreover, in the few areas where the 
potential benefits of exercising this choice could have warranted significant move-
ment, defensive company law harmonisation has effectively ensured that compa-
nies and their shareholders are unable to derive meaningful benefits from exercising 
free movement rights. As these factors are unlikely to change significantly in the 
immediate future, it is unlikely that effective regulatory competition between Mem-
ber States will emerge. Section  2 maps the continuing influence of real seat-like 
connecting factors in the legal framework governing companies, examining com-
pany law and neighbouring areas. We argue that the regime regulating a company’s 
outward-facing activities, as opposed to its internal affairs, is largely removed from 
regulatory competition and arbitrage. Section 3 explores whether adherence to real 
seat-like connecting factors in national law is in compliance with primary EU law, 
in particular the right of establishment under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). Section 4 concludes.
2  Choice of Law
Meaningful regulatory competition in corporate law requires companies to be able 
to effectively choose the legal rules governing them without this choice necessitating 
other changes to the company’s operations. In this sense, regulatory competition in 
corporate law relies on a fiction: the election of the applicable corporate law based 
on a connecting factor that can easily be manipulated and must, therefore, largely be 
fictitious or meaningless, as opposed to being grounded in an economic and social 
8 And thus establish their ‘real seat’ in the host state.
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reality. The paradigmatically meaningless connecting factor is, of course, the regis-
tered office, at least where it merely indicates the jurisdiction of incorporation and 
thus determines the applicable law according to the incorporation theory, which in 
its purest form simply provides that a company is governed by the company law of 
the country where it is incorporated. In all matters falling within the remit of corpo-
rate law (for purposes of private international law), the forum accordingly applies 
its own law if a company is, or seeks to be, incorporated under the forum’s law, and 
it recognises a company as a legal entity governed exclusively by foreign corporate 
law if it has been validly incorporated under the law of a foreign country, without 
imposing aspects of its internal corporate law on that company.9
In this pure form, the incorporation theory cannot be found in any jurisdiction,10 
including the UK, which is often referred to as a quintessential incorporation theory 
country. All jurisdictions apply certain aspects of their internal corporate law to for-
eign companies, for example in order to protect third parties in their dealings with 
the company. In the UK, examples of such rules include transparency obligations 
imposed on foreign companies and the extension of the directors’ disqualification 
regime to companies with a ‘sufficient connection’ with the UK.11 These rules con-
cern questions that are typically addressed by a jurisdiction’s company law, namely 
11 The Companies Act 2006 (ss. 1044–1059) and the Overseas Companies Regulations 2009 (SI 
2009/1801) require companies incorporated outside the United Kingdom that open an establishment in 
the UK to register as an overseas company and deliver to the UK registrar a return including information 
on the company’s name, legal form, registration in its country of incorporation, directors and secretary, 
the extent of the powers of the directors or secretary to represent the company in dealings with third par-
ties, and particulars regarding the UK establishment. Furthermore, the UK rules on directors’ disquali-
fication apply to the directors of ‘any company which may be wound up under […] the Insolvency Act’ 
(Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s. 22(2)), which captures any company that has a ‘suf-
ficient connection’ with the UK, for example because assets are located within the UK and the UK courts 
have jurisdiction over persons interested in the distribution of the assets (Insolvency Act 1986, s. 221(5)
(c)). In other Member States, the incorporation theory is sometimes explicitly qualified through subsidi-
ary connecting factors that incorporate certain elements of the real seat theory, even though most Mem-
ber States have adopted a form of incorporation theory that applies generally to EU-incorporated compa-
nies, both companies whose registered office is located in the forum and companies that are incorporated 
elsewhere in the EU (which goes beyond the requirements of Centros). For example, France and Portugal 
allow third parties to rely on the law at the place where the company’s centre of administration is located, 
if this is not the incorporation law; for details, see Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2019), Part 1, para. 59.
9 Technically, it would not be a deviation from a pure form of incorporation theory if a country’s private 
international law provided that the location of the registered office determined the applicable company 
law, and its internal company law required the real seat of the company to be located within the country’s 
territory. However, the nature of such a requirement as determining the applicable law (and hence quali-
fying as a conflict rule) or being a matter of substantive company law once the applicable law has been 
determined is not always self-evident (on this question, see Gerner-Beuerle and Schillig (2010), pp 317–
318, discussing a provision of Hungarian law stipulating that the Hungarian Company Act should only 
govern companies ‘which have their seat in Hungary’, Art. 1(1) of Law No. CXLIV of 1997 on Commer-
cial Companies). For purposes of regulatory competition, it is irrelevant whether a real seat requirement 
was qualified as a conflict rule or an element of internal company law. The possibility to compete for 
incorporations would be severely impeded if the domestic law provided that the location of the real seat 
within the forum’s territory or a similar corporate connection was a precondition for incorporation under 
domestic law.
10 For a coding of the ‘pureness’ of the incorporation theory across Member States (though without con-
sidering the relationship to other areas of law) see Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2018a), p 22.
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the information that must be disclosed about a company that trades with third parties 
and the eligibility requirements of persons who serve on corporate boards.
Ultimately, the regulation of a question as a part of company law or another legal 
area is a function of somewhat arbitrary policy decisions. While there is widespread 
consensus across legal systems that the body of rules regarded as ‘company law’ 
regulates core aspects of a company’s existence, notably its formation and internal 
governance structure,12 other aspects, in particular concerning a company’s deal-
ings with third parties, are governed by company law in some, and by adjacent legal 
areas in other jurisdictions, or, more typically, they are governed by a combination 
of interrelated company-law and non-company-law institutions in one and the same 
legal system. If characterisation for purposes of private international law mirrors 
these conceptual distinctions, the domain of the incorporation theory may be lim-
ited, and it will certainly not represent a comprehensive set of rules regulating a 
company’s existence and business activities.13
Consequently, the relevance of the registered office as a connecting factor is sub-
ject to a twofold qualification. First, it is not applicable where a legal question is 
not characterised as falling within company law for purposes of private international 
law. Secondly, even where it falls within the scope of the lex societatis (from the 
perspective of the lex fori or from a comparative perspective, depending on how 
characterisation is performed),14 the forum (or host state) which seeks to regulate 
the activities of a company incorporated elsewhere may elect to apply individual 
rules or sets of rules belonging to its company law or to another legal area that 
would not be applicable by virtue of general, in the EU often uniform, conflicts rules 
to the foreign company. We term this latter avenue to an application of host state 
law regulation by means of ‘outreach statutes’. In the next two sections, we will first 
discuss two uniform conflict rules that have the effect of limiting the scope of the lex 
societatis, before we come to outreach statutes in Sect. 2.3.
Corporate mobility and regulatory competition are thus impeded to the extent 
that subject matters relevant to companies and their dealings with third parties are 
removed from the lex societatis or, in spite of belonging to the lex societatis, are 
governed cumulatively by the lex causae and certain outreach statutes of the lex fori, 
and the connecting factor that applies in lieu of or in addition to the registered office 
is ‘grounded in reality’, that is, it cannot be manipulated as easily as a fictitious 
12 For an overview of topics that are regarded as belonging to company law (for purposes of private 
international law) in the EU Member States, see Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2016), pp 300–302. The compari-
son is complicated by the fact that not all Member States provide for codified conflicts rules enumerat-
ing the topics that fall within the scope of the lex societatis, and even if a Member State provides for an 
enumeration of topics, the list is not exhaustive and differences in the apparent scope of the lex societa-
tis may simply be a consequence of drafting differences. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is no broad 
agreement between Member States on the scope of the lex societatis, with the exception of four areas: 
corporate formation, the capacity of the company and the authority of its organs, internal management 
matters, and voluntary winding up.
13 Ibid.
14 On this question, see Allarousse (1991), pp 481–488.
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connecting factor such as the registered office.15 The relevant connection with the 
territory of a host state will vary in intensity depending on the Member State and 
the type of legal mechanism in question and may range from the domicile of parties 
to an agreement or the location of assets or business activities of some significance 
in the host state to a real seat equivalent (COMI). We will now turn to the question 
whether, outside of the lex societatis, such connecting factors ‘grounded in reality’ 
apply, and what the remaining reach of the incorporation law is where they exist.
2.1  Real Seat Equivalent: Insolvency Regulation
The closest connection of a company’s actual activities with a particular territory 
recognised in private international law for the purpose of determining the applica-
ble law is represented by the location of the real seat or, similar but not identical, 
the company’s centre of main interest (COMI). What constitutes the ‘real seat’ of 
a company is not defined uniformly across jurisdictions, but usually it is the place 
of central decision-making, that is, the place where the board of directors regularly 
meets.16 The Insolvency Regulation defines COMI as ‘the place where the debtor 
conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis’, which must be ‘ascer-
tainable by third parties’.17 These two connecting factors, of course, will not nec-
essarily lead to an application of the law at the place that is most affected by the 
company’s business activities, since the place of central decision-making may be 
different from the place where the company trades, has production facilities, or 
raises financing. However, they are a proxy that, it is presumed, will generally ensure 
that the law of the country in which the centre of a company’s activities is situated 
applies. At least historically, before the advent of modern communication technol-
ogy and fast travelling, the real seat will have been a fairly effective proxy of the 
country most closely connected to a company’s activities.
The application of that state’s law, it is further argued, is justified, because by 
deciding to pursue business activities predominantly in a particular state, the incor-
porators have accepted the policy choices made by the domestic legislator, as 
expressed in binding laws regulating, for example, the company’s capacity, internal 
organisation, the liability of the corporate organs, and the protection of creditors,18 
who expect an application of the local law.19 The fact that the real seat theory relies 
15 A survey of legal practitioners confirms that corporate mobility is impeded in practice, see Gerner-
Beuerle et al. (2016), pp 87–88 (a clear majority of 59.5% of respondents of the survey state that there 
is legal uncertainty as regards the boundary between the applicable company law and other areas (e.g., 
insolvency, tort, and contract law); notably, respondents from traditional real seat countries observe such 
legal uncertainty).
16 For a comparative overview of the definitions used in EU Member States that traditionally followed 
the real seat theory, see Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2019), Part 1, para. 56.
17 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insol-
vency proceedings [2015] OJ L141/19, Art. 3(1).
18 BGH [German Federal Court of Justice] NJW 1967, 36, 38; BGH RIW 2000, 555, 556; Kindler 
(2018), para. 412 (with further references).
19 See the Insolvency Regulation, recital 28: ‘[S]pecial consideration should be given to the creditors 
and to their perception as to where a debtor conducts the administration of its interests.’ In the 2015 
Insolvency Regulation, the criterion of ascertainability by third parties is an element of the very defini-
431The Illusion of Motion: Corporate (Im)Mobility and the Failed…
123
on the place of central decision-making, rather than the centre of a company’s busi-
ness activities, and the existence of a rebuttable presumption of identity between the 
registered office and the centre of main interest in the Insolvency Regulation,20 do 
not warrant a different assessment of the policy rationale underpinning the real seat 
theory and the Insolvency Regulation, but simply serve to facilitate the identification 
of the ‘most affected state’21 with a view to increasing legal certainty and reducing 
transaction costs.22
Whether it is convincing to justify an application of the law at the real seat with 
the hypothetical will of the incorporators who ‘opt into’ that law by locating the 
company’s main activities there23 is questionable, especially after Centros and the 
Court’s acknowledgement that the Treaty grants a right to choose the law by which 
a company is governed.24 Reliance on the ‘perceptions of creditors’25 as part of the 
definition of COMI also sits uneasily with the general approach of the Court to cred-
itor protection in the context of corporate mobility, which is based on the premise 
that creditors do not require protection going beyond another Member State’s com-
pany law, provided they are ‘on notice’ that a company has been incorporated under 
foreign law.26 Nevertheless, the conflict rules of the Insolvency Regulation introduce 
a clear element of a ‘real’ connection between a company and the applicable law 
into the European framework on corporate mobility.
The scope of the lex concursus is set out in a non-exhaustive list in the Insolvency 
Regulation. It provides that the lex concursus shall determine the conditions for the 
opening of insolvency proceedings, their conduct and closure, and further enumer-
ates a number of issues falling within the scope of international insolvency law.27 
These questions are mostly concerned with the operation and effects of the insol-
vency proceedings themselves, so that the problem of an encroachment on matters 
that may be regarded as ‘belonging’ to company law does not arise. However, the 
demarcation between company law and insolvency law is less clear with regard to 
legal mechanisms intended to protect creditors before a company is actually insol-
vent, in particular where it concerns acts in the vicinity of insolvency that jeopard-
ise the creditors’ interests or aggravate a company’s insolvency. The most impor-
tant of such mechanisms are a shift of directors’ duties to creditors in the vicinity 
27 Insolvency Regulation, Art. 7(2).
tion of COMI. This notion codifies previous case law of the European Court of Justice, which stressed 
that the criterion of ascertainability was paramount, see Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR 
I-3813, para. 33 (EU:C:2006:281); Case C-396/09 Interedil Srl, in liquidazione, v. Fallimento Interedil 
Srl, Intesa Gestione Crediti SpA [2011] ECR I-9915 (EU:C:2011:671). On the new COMI definition, see 
Mangano (2016), p 80; Mucciarelli (2016), pp 13–15.
Footnote 19 (continued)
20 Insolvency Regulation, Art. 3(1) second subparagraph.
21 This formulation is used by Kindler (2018), para. 412.
22 This is confirmed by the interpretation of the rebuttable presumption of Art. 3(1) Insolvency Regula-
tion by the CJEU, see Eurofood (n. 19), paras. 33–35.
23 See BGH NJW 1967, 36, 38.
24 Centros (n. 1), para. 27.
25 See n. 19 above.
26 Centros (n. 1), para. 36.
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of insolvency; the duty to recapitalise (or liquidate while still solvent) a company; 
the liability of directors for a failure to protect the assets of a company when the 
company nears insolvency or after cash-flow insolvency or over-indebtedness, such 
as wrongful trading, a failure to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings, 
and action en responsabilité pour insufissance d’actif (liability for insufficiency of 
assets); the liability of directors or shareholders for causing the company’s insol-
vency or frustrating claims of creditors; the re-characterization of shareholder loans 
given, or not called in, when the company nears insolvency; and avoidance actions.28 
Some of these mechanisms are structurally designed and internally classified as 
company law, for example a shift of directors’ duties or the duty to recapitalise, and 
others as insolvency law, for example liability for insufficiency of assets. However, 
they seek to address the same economic problems: asymmetric information between 
creditors and the company and the misalignment of incentives, which result in a mis-
pricing of the risk of asset substitution and the misallocation of resources, because 
directors and shareholders pursue non-value-maximizing investment projects in the 
vicinity of insolvency.29 If these mechanisms are characterized functionally for pur-
poses of private international law, they should accordingly all fall within the scope 
of either the lex societatis or the lex concursus. However, since characterization is 
governed by the lex fori and the dividing line between insolvency law and company 
law is difficult to define without reference to the boundaries drawn by the internal 
laws of a jurisdiction, it is not surprising that Member States have developed mutu-
ally incompatible and inconsistent solutions and legal uncertainty has until recently 
been high.30
The situation has somewhat improved following a line of preliminary rul-
ing requests that have given the Court of Justice an opportunity to decide on the 
characterisation of several of the above legal mechanisms and develop general cri-
teria that can guide the delimitation of international company law and insolvency 
law. The rulings centre on an interpretation of what is now Article 6(1) Insolvency 
Regulation, which provides that the courts of the Member State where insolvency 
proceedings have been opened also have jurisdiction ‘for any action which derives 
directly from the insolvency proceedings and is closely linked with them’.31 The 
Court’s interpretation of ‘closely connected action’ within the meaning of the Insol-
vency Regulation mirrors its approach to construing the bankruptcy exception in the 
EU Judgments Regulation (now the Recast Brussels Regulation), which excludes 
28 For an overview of the distribution of these mechanisms in the EU, see Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster 
(2014), pp 302–305. The mechanisms are analysed in greater detail in the country reports in the appen-
dix to Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2013).
29 See Davies (2006), pp 306–307; Eidenmüller (2006), pp 241–244.
30 See the text at nn. 64–72 below.
31 Art. 6(1) codifies the decision of the Court of Justice in Case C-339/07 Christopher Seagon v. Deko 
Marty Belgium NV [2009] ECR I-767, para. 21, which concerned an avoidance action pursuant to the 
German Insolvency Code, s. 129. The Court held that the Member State where insolvency proceedings 
were opened had international jurisdiction ‘to hear and determine actions which derive directly from 
those proceedings and which are closely connected to them’. Except for a brief reference in recital 6, 
connected actions were not regulated by the predecessor of the 2015 Insolvency Regulation, Regulation 
(EC) No. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings.
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‘proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies […] and analogous 
proceedings’ from the scope of the Regulation.32 In Gourdain v. Nadler,33 the Court 
of Justice held that the exception applied to actions that ‘derive[d] directly from the 
bankruptcy or winding-up and [were] closely connected with [insolvency] proceed-
ings’.34 In the case at hand, which concerned the French action en comblement de 
passif (the liability of a director or de facto director who committed a ‘management 
fault’ that contributed to a shortfall in the company’s assets),35 the Court ascribed 
importance to the fact that the action was brought ‘on behalf of and in the interest of 
the general body of creditors […] [in derogation] from the general rules of the law 
of liability [of directors]’ and the application to the court could only be made by the 
liquidator.36
These three factors—a derogation from the common rules of civil and com-
mercial law, the protection of the interests of the general body of creditors, and an 
action brought by the liquidator—have been reiterated and amplified by the Court in 
more recent decisions arising under the Insolvency Regulation. They seem to be the 
guiding principles that determine the scope of the insolvency court’s international 
jurisdiction and, as will be discussed presently, also the scope of the lex concursus, 
which is the law of the Member State where insolvency proceedings are opened.37 
Before we come to the applicable law, however, we will offer some comments on the 
three conditions that must be met for an action to be regarded as ‘closely connected’.
An action derogates from the common rules of civil and commercial law if it 
‘finds its source’ in rules that are ‘specific to insolvency proceedings’, and not in 
general civil or commercial law.38 This formulation is ambivalent, but the Court’s 
case law on connected actions makes it clear that the Court does not have the 
‘source’ of a rule in a Member State’s domestic law in mind, for example in the 
Member State’s company law or insolvency legislation, but the circumstances under 
which a rule applies.39 The clearest cases are provisions that require that insolvency 
32 Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ L351/1, Art. 1(2)(b). The Court of Justice regards the scope 
of the Insolvency Regulation and the Recast Brussels Regulation as mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive. Art. 6(1) Insolvency Regulation and the bankruptcy exception of the Recast Brussels Regulation 
‘must be interpreted in such a way as to avoid any overlap between the rules of law that those texts 
lay down and any legal vacuum’, C-157/13 Nickel and Goeldner Spedition GmbH v. ‘Kintra’ UAB, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2145, para. 21. Therefore, interpreting either provision necessarily determines the 
scope of the other.
33 Case 133/78 Henri Gourdain v. Franz Nadler [1979] ECR 733.
34 Ibid., p 744.
35 Art. 99 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1967, now laid down in Art. L651-2 of the French Commercial 
Code as action en responsabilité pour insufissance d’actif.
36 Gourdain v. Nadler (n. 33), p 744.
37 Insolvency Regulation, Art. 7(1).
38 Nickel & Goeldner (n. 32), para. 27.
39 See for example C-594/14 Simona Kornhaas v. Thomas Dithmar, ECLI:EU:C:2015:806 and C-295/13 
H v. H.K., ECLI:EU:C:2014:2410, concerning provisions of German law imposing liability on directors 
or managers of public and private companies for payments to creditors (or other conduct that impairs 
the assets of a company) at a time when the company is cash-flow insolvent or over-indebted, but before 
insolvency proceedings have been opened. The liability provisions are laid down in s. 64 sentence 1 
Limited Liability Companies Act [Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung] and 
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proceedings have been opened, such as the French action en responsabilité pour 
insufissance d’actif, discussed in Gourdain v. Nadler,40 wrongful or fraudulent trad-
ing,41 or actions to set aside a transaction detrimental to the interests of the credi-
tors entered into during a certain number of years before the opening of insolvency 
proceedings (avoidance actions).42 More widely, the Court held in H v. H.K. and 
Kornhaas that provisions that sanction the conduct of a director at a time when the 
company was insolvent, without insolvency proceedings having (yet) been opened, 
may be closely connected, including where the action can be pursued by creditors 
outside of insolvency proceedings.43
Finally, while not decided by the Court in H v. H.K. and Kornhaas, it may be 
argued that conduct that does not occur while a company is insolvent, but in the 
vicinity of insolvency, may in appropriate circumstances give rise to a closely con-
nected action. For example, under German law, directors are liable to a company 
if they make payments to shareholders that cause the insolvency of the company.44 
The proximity that must exist between the payment and the company’s insolvency 
according to the German provision is comparable to the requirements of some other 
legal mechanisms that impose liability on directors for acts in the vicinity of insol-
vency, such as wrongful trading, which is characterized as insolvency law by the UK 
courts.45 Payments are made in violation of the German provision if the company 
Footnote 39 (continued)
s. 92(2) sentence 1 Stock Corporation Act [Aktiengesetz], not in the Insolvency Code. Nevertheless, the 
Court of Justice held that actions enforcing liability based on s. 64 sentence 1 Limited Liability Compa-
nies Act ‘clearly derogate[d] from the common rules of civil and commercial law, specifically because of 
the insolvency of the debtor company’, H v. H.K., para. 23, quoted in Kornhaas, para. 16 (the same must 
hold true for s. 92(2) sentence 1 Stock Corporation Act, which is phrased similarly).
40 The action en responsabilité pour insufissance d’actif can only be brought if a company has entered 
insolvent liquidation (liquidation judiciaire), Gerner-Beuerle and Schillig (2019), p 876.
41 UK Insolvency Act 1986, ss. 213(2), 214(1) (providing that liability for wrongful and fraudulent trad-
ing is imposed on the application of the liquidator). Accordingly, UK courts have classified wrongful 
trading as insolvency law for purposes of private international law, see Re Howard Holdings [1998] BCC 
549; Oakley v. Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2005] EWHC 872 (Ch), para. 42.
42 Seagon v. Deko Marty (n. 31), para. 16; Case C-296/17 Wiemer and Trachte GmbH v. Zhan Oved 
Tadzher, ECLI:EU:C:2018:902, para. 26 (holding also that the jurisdiction to hear closely connected 
actions is exclusive).
43 Pursuant to s. 64 sentence 1 Limited Liability Companies Act, the provision that was at issue in H 
v. H.K. and Kornhaas (n. 39), a director is liable to pay compensation to a company to the extent that 
the director makes payments after the company has become cash-flow insolvent or over-indebted (the 
liquidation value of an asset received as consideration by the company may be subtracted from the com-
pensation claim, Müller (2018), § 64, paras. 149–149g). While the company’s claim is typically enforced 
by the liquidator after insolvency proceedings are opened, the opening of insolvency proceedings is not 
a precondition for the provision to apply, Müller, ibid., paras. 173–174 (similar considerations apply to 
s. 92(2) sentence 1 Stock Corporation Act, Fleischer (2019), § 92, para. 37). If the court refuses to open 
insolvency proceedings because the assets are insufficient, creditors may be entitled to pursue the action 
individually (see Müller, ibid., para. 174). In this case, the action would no longer qualify as a connected 
action pursuant to the third condition of Gourdain v. Nadler, see the text at nn. 51–52 below and Müller, 
ibid., para. 176.
44 Limited Liability Companies Act, s. 64 sentence 3, and Stock Corporation Act, s. 92(2) sentence 3. H 
v. H.K. and Kornhaas concerned the first sentence of s. 64 Limited Liability Companies Act.
45 See n. 41 above.
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will not be able to satisfy its debts as they fall due, unless the director, exercising 
the care of a prudent businessman, could not have known that this would be the 
consequence of the payment.46 As with the liability provision at issue in H v. H.K. 
and Kornhaas, the company can claim compensation from the director, irrespective 
of whether or not insolvency proceedings have been opened, although the claim will 
typically be brought by the liquidator after the company has gone into insolvent liq-
uidation. Given these similarities, it seems likely that the Court of Justice would 
qualify the claim as a closely connected action.47
The second condition of Gourdain v. Nadler is satisfied if an action benefits all 
creditors, notably by increasing the funds available for distribution, for example, as 
a result of holding a director or shareholder personally liable.48 Whether this condi-
tion has much independent relevance is questionable, since claims of an insolvent 
company will always benefit the creditors as a general body if they are enforced 
successfully. In order to determine whether or not a particular claim can, in princi-
ple, fall within the scope of the Insolvency Regulation, the first condition is a more 
useful screening mechanism, since claims that do not arise in derogation from the 
‘common rules of civil and commercial law’, as defined above, will not be con-
nected with the insolvency of a company.49 If this first condition is satisfied, it only 
remains to be seen whether the claim is actually enforced in the context of insol-
vency proceedings (see the third condition, discussed in the next paragraph) in order 
to determine whether it falls within the scope of the Insolvency Regulation. Through 
this lens, the reference by the Court of Justice to ‘the interest of the general body of 
creditors’ can therefore be understood as a clarification of the other two conditions 
that is largely absorbed in them and illustrates how insolvency law may be differen-
tiated from company law in functional terms.50
46 BT-Drs. [Documentation of the Federal Parliament] 16/6140, 47. Compare this formulation with s. 
214(2) UK Insolvency Act 1986 (wrongful trading).
47 This is also the opinion of some commentators, see for example Fleischer (2019), para. 41a; Krawc-
zyk-Giehsmann (2019), pp 18–20.
48 Gourdain v. Nadler (n. 33), p 744.
49 Examples are Nickel and Goeldner (n. 32) (see the discussion in the text at n. 56 below); C-292/08 
German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v. Alice van der Schee [2009] ECR I-8421 (holding 
that an application for the adoption of protective measures based on a retention of title clause that was 
brought by a seller in the insolvency of the buyer was not a closely connected action, but constituted ‘an 
independent claim, as it [was] not based on the law of the insolvency proceedings and require[d] nei-
ther the opening of such proceedings nor the involvement of a liquidator’, para. 32); C-641/16 Tünkers 
France v. Expert France, ECLI:EU:C:2017:847 (concerning an action for damages for unfair competi-
tion brought by the subsidiary of an insolvent company); and C-535/17 NK v. BNP Paribas Fortis NV, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:96 (holding that a tortious claim for damages brought by a liquidator in the interest of 
all creditors against a third party that had allegedly acted wrongfully towards the creditors (a so-called 
Peeters/Gatzen claim under Dutch law) was ‘based on the ordinary rules of civil and commercial law and 
not on the derogating rules specific to insolvency proceedings’, para. 34).
50 It is of course not possible to distinguish insolvency law from company law solely on the basis of the 
function of a provision as protecting ‘the interest of the general body of creditors’; otherwise much of 
company law would have to be qualified as insolvency law for purposes of the Insolvency Regulation and 
private international law. For this reason, the Court’s assessment of whether a rule derogates from the 
common rules of civil and commercial law goes beyond an identification of the protected interests, see 
text at nn. 39–44 above.
436 C. Gerner-Beuerle et al.
123
Turning to the third condition, the involvement of a liquidator, the case law of 
the Court of Justice initially seemed to imply that an action was closely connected 
with insolvency proceedings if it could only be brought by the liquidator in the event 
of the insolvency of a company.51 In later cases, the Court clarified that an action 
that is ‘actually brought in the context of insolvency proceedings’ is a closely con-
nected action (provided the other two conditions are satisfied), even if it concerns 
a claim that does not require the opening of insolvency proceedings and can also 
be enforced outside of insolvency proceedings.52 Conversely, if it is brought as an 
individual action and not in the context of insolvency proceedings, it falls within 
the scope of the Recast Brussels Regulation.53 This is also the case if an action that 
can generally only be pursued by the liquidator has been assigned to a third party 
for a percentage of the proceeds obtained from the claim as consideration.54 The 
consequence of this distinction is that many legal mechanisms have a dual nature. 
They are characterized as insolvency law for purposes of international jurisdiction 
51 For example, in Gourdain v. Nadler (n. 33), pp 744–745, the Court emphasised that it was ‘only the 
“syndic” [liquidator] […] who could make this application [to order the de facto director to pay parts of 
the company’s debts]’. See also Seagon v. Deko Marty (n. 31), para. 16 (holding that ‘[o]nly the liquida-
tor may bring [an avoidance action] in the event of insolvency with the sole purpose of protecting the 
interests of the general body of creditors’).
52 H v. H.K. (n. 39), paras. 20–22.
53 Ibid., paras. 24–25. See also C-147/12 ÖFAB v. Frank Koot, ECLI:EU:C:2013:490. In this case, a 
Swedish company had suspended payments and the district court at the place of the company’s seat had 
issued a company reconstruction order (‘företagsrekonstruktion’), pursuant to which the company’s cred-
itors were paid part of their claims. The balance of the claims was acquired by an investment company, 
which then brought a claim against one of the directors of the insolvent company for the outstanding 
amount. The action was based on a provision of Swedish company law pursuant to which directors are 
personally liable for the debts of a company if they allow the company to continue to trade at a time 
when it no longer has sufficient funds and the directors fail to take certain measures to monitor and 
address the company’s financial difficulties (reproduced ibid., para. 8). The Swedish company recon-
struction order is an insolvency proceeding within the meaning of Art. 2(4) Insolvency Regulation and 
Annex A to the Regulation. However, the Court of Justice held that the investment company’s action did 
not constitute a closely connected action because it did not concern ‘the exclusive prerogative of the liq-
uidator to be exercised in the interests of the general body of creditors’ (para. 25). Therefore, jurisdiction 
was determined by the Judgments Regulation (now the Recast Brussels Regulation), and here specifi-
cally by what is now Art. 7(2) Recast Brussels Regulation, which concerns special jurisdiction in matters 
relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict (para. 42).
54 C-213/10 F-Tex SIA v. Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB ‘Jadecloud-Vilma’, ECLI:EU:C:2012:215, paras. 40-46, 
concerning the assignment of an avoidance action. The court in F-Tex acknowledged ‘that the right on 
which the applicant in the main proceedings bases its action is linked with the insolvency of the debtor 
as it has its origin in the right to have a transaction set aside conferred on the liquidator by the national 
law applicable to insolvency proceedings’ (para. 40). However, it held that ‘the exercise by the assignee 
of the right acquired is not closely connected with the insolvency proceedings […] [since it] is subject to 
rules other than those applicable in insolvency proceedings’ (paras. 41–42). In the opinion of the court, 
the claim is different in nature once it has been assigned, because the assignee does not act in the inter-
est of the creditors, but for his personal benefit and can freely decide whether or not to enforce the claim 
(paras. 43–44). This line of reasoning seems to indicate that the assignee’s action is not closely con-
nected because it is not pursued in the interest of the general body of creditors (the second condition of 
Gourdain v. Nadler). However, if a percentage of the proceeds obtained from enforcing the claim is paid 
into the insolvent estate, enforcement of the claim is in the interest of the general body of creditors. The 
main reason, then, for excluding the claim from the scope of the Insolvency Regulation seems to be that 
it is not brought by the liquidator (the third condition of Gourdain v. Nadler).
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and private international law if they are enforced by the liquidator, and as company 
law (or indeed another legal area, for example tort law) if enforced by a third party. 
This approach may be criticised for rendering the applicable law a function of some-
what arbitrary differences in a Member State’s internal laws, which may pursue very 
similar policy goals with or without the involvement of a liquidator.55 Nevertheless, 
it is now firmly embedded in the Court’s case law.
Case law furthermore shows that the three conditions apply cumulatively. An 
action to enforce a claim for payment of services rendered by an insolvent company 
was held not to be a closely connected action, even though the action of course ben-
efited the general body of creditors by improving the asset position of the company 
and was, in the case at hand, brought by the liquidator after the opening of insol-
vency proceedings. The court explained that ‘[t]he fact that, after the opening of 
insolvency proceedings against a service provider, the action for payment is taken by 
the insolvency administrator appointed in the course of those proceedings […] does 
not substantially amend the nature of the debt relied on which continues to be sub-
ject, in terms of the substance of the matter, to the rules of [general commercial] law 
which remain unchanged.’56 Conversely, avoidance actions derogate from the rules 
of general civil and commercial law, but if they are not enforced by the liquidator 
and instead assigned to a third party, they are no longer ‘closely connected with […] 
insolvency proceedings’.57
All cases mentioned so far, with the exception of Kornhaas,58 concerned the 
scope of the insolvency court’s international jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 3 and 
6 Insolvency Regulation. Until Kornhaas was decided in December 2015, it was 
therefore unclear whether the Gourdain v. Nadler criteria also determined the scope 
of the lex concursus, the applicable law pursuant to Article 7 Insolvency Regula-
tion.59 In Kornhaas, the Court answered the question in the affirmative. Kornhaas 
dealt with a reference from the German Federal Court of Justice regarding the char-
acterization of a provision imposing liability on managers of a private limited com-
pany incorporated under the laws of England and Wales for payments made after 
the company had become insolvent. The Court referred to its prior holding in H 
v. H.K.,60 a case concerning the same provision of German law, where it had held 
55 On this point, see Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster (2014), p 313. It is also not self-evident why the effi-
ciency gains that justify including closely connected actions within the scope of the Insolvency Regu-
lation (recital 35) should take precedence over the policy rationales underpinning the determination of 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Recast Brussels Regulation if the liquidator brings the action, but not if a 
third party brings the action.
56 Nickel and Goeldner (n. 32), para. 29.
57 F-Tex (n. 54), para. 47.
58 See n. 39 above.
59 Some commentators had argued that the international scope of substantive insolvency law should be 
interpreted more broadly than the scope of the Insolvency Regulation in order to strengthen the protec-
tion of creditors (on the assumption that it was in the interest of the creditors that the law at the COMI 
applied), Kindler (2018), para. 664 (who maintains after Kornhaas that legal mechanisms at the intersec-
tion of company law and insolvency law should be characterized as insolvency law unless they clearly 
fall within the scope of the lex societatis).
60 See n. 39 above.
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that a national court that has international jurisdiction to open insolvency proceed-
ings pursuant to Article 3 Insolvency Regulation has jurisdiction to rule on such 
an action. The Court concluded from H v. H.K. that the German provision had to 
be qualified as insolvency law not only for the purpose of determining the interna-
tional jurisdiction of the insolvency court, but that it was also ‘covered by the law 
applicable to insolvency proceedings and their effects, within the meaning of Article 
[7(1)]’ of the Insolvency Regulation.61 The Court added that the German provision 
fell within the scope of the lex concursus by virtue of Article 7(2) Insolvency Regu-
lation, which provides, inter alia, that the lex concursus shall determine the condi-
tions for the opening of insolvency proceedings. In order to ensure the effectiveness 
of provisions of national law requiring that insolvency proceedings be opened, the 
Court argued that Article 7(2) Insolvency Regulation ‘must be interpreted as mean-
ing that, first, the preconditions for the opening of insolvency proceedings, second, 
the rules which designate the persons who are obliged to request the opening of 
those proceedings and, third, the consequences of an infringement of that obligation 
fall within its scope.’62
We will now apply the Court’s criteria to those of the above legal mechanisms 
potentially belonging to either the lex societatis or the lex concursus63 that have not 
yet been the subject matter of a decision by the Court (a shift of directors’ duties 
to creditors in the vicinity of insolvency; duty to recapitalise a company; wrongful 
trading; liability for failure to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings; the 
liability of directors or shareholders for causing the company’s insolvency or frus-
trating claims of creditors; and the re-characterization of shareholder loans).
First, in obiter, Kornhaas makes it clear that provisions penalising directors for 
trading at a time when the company should have been put into insolvent liquida-
tion—wrongful trading, liability for failure to file, and similar mechanisms—are 
principally caught by the lex concursus.64 However, in spite of the fact that it is 
universally acknowledged that Articles 6 and 7 Insolvency Regulation have to be 
interpreted autonomously, Kornhaas does not ensure a consistent treatment of all 
functionally comparable mechanisms. ÖFAB v. Frank Koot illustrates the problem. 
The case concerned a provision pursuant to which directors are personally liable 
for the debts of a company that continues to trade in insolvency.65 It is therefore 
functionally equivalent, for example, to wrongful trading under UK law.66 However, 
importantly, the provision can be, and was in the case at hand, enforced by creditors 
61 Kornhaas (n. 39), para. 17.
62 Ibid., para. 19. Similar Case C-212/15 ENEFI Energiahatékonysági Nyrt v. DGRFP, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:841, para. 18.
63 Text at n. 28.
64 Kornhaas (n. 39), para. 19. Member States had not developed a consistent approach, with a majority 
classifying the duty to file and liability for failure to file as insolvency law, a sizeable minority as com-
pany law, and classification being controversial or uncertain in several other Member States, see Gerner-
Beuerle et  al. (2019), Part 1, para. 84. These differences in characterisation are unlikely to disappear 
completely with a consistent application of the Gourdain v. Nadler conditions, as will be discussed pres-
ently in the text.
65 For further details, see n. 53 above.
66 Davies (2006); see also Bachner (2004).
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individually. The third condition of Gourdain v. Nadler, accordingly, was not satis-
fied, and the Court of Justice concluded that the action did not fall within the scope 
of the Insolvency Regulation (however, this does not mean that the provision is to be 
characterized as company law, as we will see in Sect. 2.2.1 below).67
Secondly, the liability of a director who does not act in the interest of creditors 
after duties have shifted from shareholders to creditors in the vicinity of insolvency 
is typically enforced by the liquidator in the insolvency of a company in the interest 
of ‘the company’s creditors as a whole’.68 Thus, the operation of creditor-regard-
ing duties conforms to the second and third conditions of Gourdain v. Nadler. This 
leaves the question whether they derogate from ordinary civil and commercial law. 
Arguably, this question needs to be answered in the affirmative, at least if directors’ 
duties are structured as in the UK Companies Act 2006, which have the interests of 
the shareholders at their centre,69 since creditor-regarding duties then deviate from 
general directors’ duties at a particular point in time in a company’s life. On this 
view, liability claims against directors who disregard creditor interests in the vicinity 
of insolvency would, accordingly, have to be qualified as closely connected actions, 
provided the liquidator enforces the claims.
Thirdly, the characterisation of the duty to recapitalise a company and of the re-
characterization of shareholder loans as equity capital are ambivalent in the Member 
States, which is not surprising, given the range of designs for these mechanisms in 
national laws. The duty to call a general meeting and either recapitalise or liquidate 
a company operates, at least potentially, in the vicinity of insolvency, but it relies on 
general mechanisms of corporate law to achieve its regulatory goal and, of course, 
does not involve a liquidator. This may be different, however, where the focus is on 
liability for the failure to comply with the duty. Here, claims may well be designed 
in a way resembling liability for a failure to file for the opening of insolvency pro-
ceedings or similar mechanisms.70 The doctrine of equity-replacing shareholder 
loans can form part of a jurisdiction’s capital maintenance regime or be designed 
as an insolvency law mechanism and entail the subordination of shareholder loans 
in insolvency.71 In the former case, where the usual consequences of a violation of 
capital maintenance rules apply if a shareholder loan that has been re-characterised 
as equity capital is repaid, the mechanism will typically not derogate from ordinary 
67 A provision giving rise to similar classification problems is s. 68 of the Czech Business Corporation 
Act, see Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2019), Part 1, paras. 82–84.
68 Re Pantone 485 Ltd [2002] 1 BCLC 266.
69 UK Companies Act 2006, s. 172(1). This may be different in other legal systems, see Gerner-Beuerle 
and Schuster (2014), p 326. See also the Italian reform of insolvency law (Legislative Decree of 12 Janu-
ary 2019, no. 14), according to which directors are under a duty to assess whether their company risks 
becoming insolvent and react promptly to pre-insolvency situations by triggering one of the workout 
mechanisms detailed in the law (see in particular the new Art. 2086(2) Civil Code).
70 For an example of a provision imposing liability on directors who do not comply with the duty to 
recapitalise or liquidate a company, see González Fernández (2013), pp A 807, 827.
71 Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2019), Part 1, para. 83.
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commercial law, whereas it falls outside the scope of the lex societatis in the latter 
case.72
The situation outlined above can lead to significant inconsistencies in how the rel-
evant rules are applied where companies exercise their right to choose the applica-
ble company law by relying on Centros. Moreover, the complexity of the questions 
arising, as well as the large number of host state-home state combinations results 
in a high degree of legal uncertainty for both companies and their creditors. This is 
particularly true given that, in many Member States, directors’ duties are enforced 
virtually exclusively in the context of insolvency.73 As the potential benefits of regu-
latory arbitrage tend to be modest to start with, it would be unsurprising if costs 
associated with legal uncertainty and complexity in themselves were sufficient to 
discourage corporate migration.
Additionally, several of the largest Member States, including Germany, France, 
Italy, and Spain, rely in important respects on insolvency law, and thus effectively 
real seat-based rules to regulate corporate behaviour.74 This is somewhat compa-
rable to the situation in the US, where the scope of company law, according to the 
internal affairs doctrine, is centred around the shareholder–director relationship, 
with creditors mainly being protected through insolvency law rules. However, while 
insolvency law is federal in the US, and thus uniform across all states, it differs sig-
nificantly across EU Member States. Therefore, for companies primarily operating 
in a Member State that relies on company law in order to protect creditors, a change 
in the applicable company law away from this country may result in reduced pro-
tection standards, and for companies primarily operating in a Member State that 
relies on insolvency law to protect creditors, a change in the applicable company 
law will have a diminished effect on the rules they are subject to, even in circum-
stances where no duplication of legal requirements results.75 In contrast, in the US, 
72 For example, the German doctrine of equity-replacing loans, in the version in force until 2008, was 
laid down in a company law statute, Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung 
(GmbHG) [Limited Liability Companies Act], ss. 32a, 32b. Section 32a(1) provided that the sharehold-
er’s claim for the repayment of the loan was subordinated in the company’s insolvency. In spite of its 
company law provenance, this aspect of the doctrine was characterised as insolvency law, since it only 
became relevant once insolvency proceedings had been opened, BGH, judgment of 21 July 2011, IX 
ZR 185/10, BGHZ 190, 364. The German courts had furthermore held that re-characterised shareholder 
loans were to be treated as equity capital, with the consequence that they could not be repaid while the 
company was in financial distress (s. 30 GmbHG) and payments made in contravention of the capital 
maintenance rules had to be returned by the recipient shareholder (s. 31 GmbHG). These aspects of the 
doctrine of equity-replacing loans were classified as company law for the purposes of private interna-
tional law, BGH, judgment of 25 June 2001, II ZR 38/99, BGHZ 148, 167. The provisions on equity-
replacing shareholder loans are now consolidated in the German Insolvency Code, ss. 39, 135, which 
draw on traditional insolvency law mechanisms to regulate them, notably subordination and the avoid-
ance of repayments within one year before the opening of insolvency proceedings. It is therefore now 
widely acknowledged that the doctrine is to be characterised as insolvency law, BGH, judgment of 21 
July 2011, ibid.
73 See the examples in Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster (2014), pp 326–328.
74 Ibid.
75 On the duplication of rules due to inconsistent characterisation across jurisdictions, see Gerner-Beu-
erle and Schuster (2014), p 296. See also Mucciarelli (2012), pp 456–457, emphasizing that European 
company law regimes, in contrast to the US, also tend to embrace creditor protection goals, but that 
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a disagreement about the scope of company law, and more generally the role that 
company law, insolvency law and other legal areas play in addressing the conflicts 
that the use of the corporate form gives rise to, is limited, given the common herit-
age of the 51 US jurisdictions. As a result, the few existing differences in corporate 
law, for example with regard to power allocation and board insulation, are more rel-
evant when the decision is made where to incorporate, and at the same time it is less 
costly for firms to incorporate in another state than in the EU, because the problem 
of over- or underinclusive regulatory regimes, or simply lack of clarity about the 
applicable rules, does not exist to the same extent. On the other hand, effective pro-
tection of creditors based on a company’s COMI may render post-Centros opportu-
nities for regulatory arbitrage politically more palatable in the EU.
2.2  Effects of Business Activity: Rome II
Conflict rules determining the law applicable to non-contractual obligations gener-
ally require a less intense connection with the applicable law than the Insolvency 
Regulation. In the EU, they are governed by the Rome II Regulation.76 Company law 
may overlap in particular with two types of non-contractual obligations, tort law and 
culpa in contrahendo, in situations where misconduct by a corporate insider gives 
rise to claims of either the company or third parties against the corporate insider.77 
The connecting factor in tort law is the place where the damage occurs, thus lead-
ing to the application of the lex damni,78 unless the parties involved in the tort have 
their habitual residence in the same country or the tort is ‘manifestly more closely 
connected’ with another country.79 Culpa in contrahendo is defined as ‘a non-con-
tractual obligation arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract’ and 
is governed by the law that applies, or would have applied, to the contract.80 Alter-
natively, if that law cannot be determined, the connecting factors of tort law apply.81
The lex damni that is applicable pursuant to Article 4(1) Rome II Regulation 
will, in the present context, generally be the law of the country where sharehold-
ers, creditors, or other stakeholders reside who have suffered a loss as a result of the 
challenged conduct.82 Misconduct of corporate insiders that amounts to a tortious 
act within the meaning of Rome II will typically also constitute a breach of direc-
tors’ duties under company law. Therefore, where claimants are resident in coun-
tries other than the incorporation state, the challenged conduct will be subject to at 
Member States were beginning to relax mechanisms for creditor protection, with the consequence that 
creditors might increasingly rely on non-company law mechanisms, such as insolvency law.
Footnote 75 (continued)
76 Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 
(Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40.
77 Ibid., Art. 12.
78 Ibid., Art. 4(1).
79 Ibid., Art. 4(2), (3).
80 Ibid., Art. 12(1).
81 Ibid., Art. 12(2).
82 However, see also n. 113 below.
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least two simultaneously applying sets of behavioural constraints and sanctioning 
regimes. This accumulation of legal regimes could be avoided if the law applica-
ble to the tortious act was determined pursuant to Article 4(3) Rome II Regulation 
instead of Article 4(1), and it could be argued that a manifestly closer connection 
existed with the country where the registered office of a defendant director’s com-
pany was located. However, Article 4(3) is described as an ‘escape clause’,83 and a 
general disapplication of the rules of Article 4(1) and (2) in favour of the lex soci-
etatis if the defendant is a director or manager of a company is difficult to reconcile 
with the decision of the drafters of the Rome II Regulation to define the habitual 
residence of a company as the place of central administration or, when the damage 
arises in the course of the operation of a branch or other establishment, the place 
where the branch or establishment is located.84
The Rome II Regulation defines the term ‘non-contractual obligations’ negatively 
by excluding several matters from the scope of the Regulation, in the context of busi-
ness activities of a company in particular ‘non-contractual obligations arising out of 
the law of companies […] regarding matters such as the creation, by registration 
or otherwise, legal capacity, internal organisation or winding-up of companies […] 
[and] the personal liability of officers and members as such for the obligations of the 
company or body’.85 The Rome II Regulation therefore confirms that certain ques-
tions of core company law, including liability for a breach of directors’ duties, are 
governed by the lex societatis.86 However, the situation is less clear where the legal 
mechanism is not directly related to a company’s internal governance structure or 
the position of a defendant as a director or member. In such cases, it is often neces-
sary to determine when legal mechanisms give rise to the personal liability of offic-
ers and members as such, and when they impose liability on tortfeasors irrespec-
tive of their position as an officer or member. The relevant legal mechanisms can be 
found in diverse legal areas in the Member States, ranging from company law to tort, 
quasi-contract, and securities regulation. The situation is further complicated by the 
use of broadly phrased, open-ended tort law provisions in many Member States that 
are susceptible to being utilised in a variety of situations closely related to processes 
within corporations and affecting corporate stakeholders.87 To give a few examples 
from national case law, tort law has been relied upon to impose liability on directors 
for incorrect corporate disclosures88 or acts that harm creditors.89 In other situations, 
83 Rome II Regulation, Recital 18.
84 Ibid., Art. 23(1).
85 Ibid., Art. 1(2)(d). The literature defines tort as ‘an act which is wrongful, other than by reason of its 
being a breach of contract or trust’, Stone (2018), para. 17.09.
86 See, e.g., Calliess (2015), Article 1 Rome II, para. 51.
87 Such open-ended tort law provisions are particularly common in legal systems belonging to the 
French legal tradition, see French Civil Code, Arts. 1240, 1241 (formerly 1382, 1383).
88 For an example from France, see Cass. com., 22 November 2005 (Sté Eurodirect marketing c/
Pfeiffer), RTD com. 2006, p 445.
89 For example, liability pursuant to the German Civil Code, s. 823(2), was held to be triggered where a 
director violated various duties of a criminal and insolvency law nature, including the failure to file for 
the opening of insolvency proceedings, see BGHZ 126, 181.
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the dissemination of incorrect information to investors and shareholders has been 
held to constitute a breach of pre-contractual duties (culpa in contrahendo),90 and 
in still others a breach of directors’ duties under company law.91 The case law of the 
Court of Justice offers very limited guidance on the characterisation of the different 
legal mechanisms, and a common approach to determining the demarcation between 
the lex societatis and the law applicable to non-contractual obligations has not yet 
emerged in the EU.
In the following paragraphs, we will discuss the views held in the Member States 
on this question, focussing on provisions of national law at the intersection of com-
pany law and tort law that impose liability on directors, and provisions holding 
shareholders liable for the debts of a company (piercing the corporate veil). Con-
sidering available guidance from the Court of Justice, we argue that liability claims 
other than those based on a core set of company law duties, for example the liabil-
ity of directors for a breach of information obligations towards investors or entering 
into obligations that a director knows the company will not be able to perform, and 
the liability of shareholders for entering into a transaction that is detrimental to the 
interests of the creditors and leading to the insolvency of the company, are removed 
from the scope of the lex societatis.
2.2.1  Liability of Directors
The approaches pursued by Member States in order to distinguish between acts com-
mitted by a director that lead to liability under company law and acts that are gov-
erned by the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, especially tort law, can 
be roughly divided into three groups. First, several Member States draw a distinc-
tion along the lines of substantive law: liability questions that arise from a breach 
of directors’ duties, the articles of association, or more generally from a breach of 
company law, are characterised as company law for purposes of private international 
law, and situations where liability arises from a wrongful act that is not grounded in 
company law—and that does not consist of a breach of contract or trust either—are 
characterised as non-contractual in nature and thus subject to the Rome II Regula-
tion.92 Secondly, in some Member States, conflict of laws characterisation is based 
on the type of harmful act. If an act involves the exercise of corporate power, it 
falls within the scope of the lex societatis; otherwise, conflict rules from tort law 
or another legal area apply. A final approach distinguishes according to the type of 
injured party: the lex societatis governs any mechanism that gives rise to liability if 
a loss is caused to the company (and only so-called reflective loss to the sharehold-
ers), and the lex loci delicti commissi governs damages claims of third parties that 
90 For example, in Germany: BGHZ 71, 284; 72, 382 (dealing with incorrect statements by directors and 
others to induce investors to invest in a mutual fund or another investment vehicle). More generally see 
Cartwright and Hesselink (2008).
91 See, for example, the UK case Peskin v. Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC 372.
92 See Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2019), Part 1, paras. 88–89 for a comprehensive comparative overview.
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suffer a direct (i.e. not only reflective93) loss. Third parties may include sharehold-
ers, if they suffer a loss in an individual capacity, rather than in their capacity as a 
shareholder because of a reduction in the value of their shareholding,94 as well as 
company outsiders, such as creditors or customers.
Of the three approaches, the first one best conforms—with one important caveat 
that will be discussed presently—to the existing system of European conflict rules 
as set out in the Rome I95 and Rome II Regulations.96 Liability for a breach of 
directors’ duties, giving rise to a claim of the company or against a director, can 
be interpreted as being a matter of the internal organisation of the company within 
the meaning of Article 1(2)(d) Rome II Regulation, which is accordingly excluded 
from the scope of the Rome II Regulation. This view has been confirmed implicitly 
by the Court of Justice, which decided in Holterman Ferho Exploitatie BV v. Spies 
von Büllesheim97 that liability claims based on a breach of directors’ duties did not 
fall within the special tort jurisdiction of the Brussels Regulation. The Court held 
that where ‘a company sues its former manager on the basis of allegedly wrongful 
conduct, Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 [dealing with jurisdiction for tort 
claims98] must be interpreted as meaning that that action is a matter relating to tort 
or delict where the conduct complained of may not be considered to be a breach of 
the manager’s obligations under company law’.99 Since the Brussels and Rome II 
93 It is not clear in all Member States whether the law accords shareholders a dual role depending on the 
type of loss suffered, although this seems to be the case at least in the Member States where case law on 
the issue exists, for example France (Cass. com., 1 April 1997, Bull. Joly Sociétés 1997, p 650, comment 
by J.F. Barbièri; Cass. crim., 13 December 2000, Bull. Joly Sociétés 2001, p 497), Italy (Art. 2395 Civil 
Code for public companies and Art. 2476(7) Civil Code for private companies), and the UK (Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204).
94 For an example of a case where an individual right of shareholders was infringed, see Pender v. Lush-
ington (1877) L.R. 6 Ch. D. 70.
95 Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
(Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6.
96 It is also in line with the so-called Sonnenberger proposal on the harmonisation of private interna-
tional company law, Sonnenberger (2007), which stipulates that the lex societatis shall govern, inter alia, 
‘liability arising from the breach of duties imposed by company law’, Art. 3(1), no. 8.
97 C-47/14 Holterman Ferho Exploitatie BV, Ferho Bewehrungsstahl GmbH, Ferho Vechta GmbH, 
Ferho Frankfurt GmbH v. Friedrich Leopold Freiherr Spies von Büllesheim, ECLI:EU:C:2015:574.
98 Now Art. 7(2) Recast Brussels Regulation.
99 Holterman Ferho Exploitatie BV v. Spies von Büllesheim (n. 97), para. 79 (emphasis added). In the 
case at hand, the action, which had been ‘brought by the company against its former manager on the 
basis of the alleged breach of his obligation to perform his duties properly under company law’ was held 
‘to come within the concept of “matters relating to contract” for the purposes of Article 5(1) of Regula-
tion No. 44/2001’ (now Art. 7(1) Recast Brussels Regulation), ibid., para. 54. The action was qualified as 
contractual because special jurisdiction in matters of contract and tort are regarded as mutually exhaus-
tive in liability actions: ‘It is settled case-law that Article 5(3) of Regulation 44/2001 [Art. 7(2) Recast 
Brussels Regulation] applies to all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and do 
not concern “matters relating to a contract” within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the regulation [Art. 
7(1) Recast Brussels Regulation]’, ibid., para. 68. The Court therefore interprets ‘matters relating to a 
contract’ as comprising not only the employment or service contract concluded between a director and a 
company, but generally the legal relationship between them, including statutory duties owed by a director 
to the company, ibid., para. 69.
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Regulations have to be interpreted consistently,100 the Court’s holding is also rel-
evant to a characterisation of liability claims for a breach of directors’ duties under 
Rome II and international company law.
The caveat is that the interpretation of what constitutes a tort/delict cannot be 
guided by the demarcation between company law and tort law pursuant to a Member 
State’s internal laws, which differ in how they design legal institutions sanctioning 
misconduct by company directors, but must be based on an autonomous understand-
ing of ‘the law of companies’ within the meaning of Article 1(2)(d) Rome II Regu-
lation.101 For example, disclosure obligations that arise when a company accesses 
public financial markets or is involved in a takeover may be set out in a Member 
State’s internal company law, but it is now widely accepted that liability for incor-
rect disclosures would nevertheless need to be characterised as falling outside the 
scope of the lex societatis.102 The Court of Justice has also held in Harald Kolassa 
v. Barclays Bank103 that for purposes of interpreting the Brussels Regulation and 
determining international jurisdiction, prospectus liability claims as well as dam-
ages claims for ‘breaches of other legal information obligations towards investors’104 
concern ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’.105 While the connecting 
factor for jurisdiction (‘place where the harmful event occurred’)106 is different 
from the connecting factor to determine the applicable law pursuant to the Rome 
100 Rome II Regulation, Recital 7.
101 In addition, determining the scope of the lex loci delicti commissi by distinguishing between breaches 
of directors’ duties and acts that are not grounded in company law has the disadvantage that it may lead 
to the cumulative application of two liability regimes if a director’s conduct constitutes both a breach of 
company law and general tort law and the place where the damage occurs pursuant to Art. 4(1) Rome II 
Regulation is not in the country where the company is registered or incorporated.
102 See Gerner-Beuerle et  al. (2019), Part 1, para. 89. However, some uncertainties persist in national 
law. For example, in the Netherlands it is unclear whether misrepresentations in the annual accounts and 
reports that cause damage to third parties should be classified as tort law or company law. Vlas (2009), 
no. 307, suggests that liability is governed by the lex societatis. In Cyprus, prospectus liability is laid 
down in the Law of Companies, Cap. 113, Art. 43, which has led commentators to conclude that the pro-
vision should be classified as company law, Markou and Zantira (2019), Part 2 V, para. 74. In Germany, 
some commentators suggest a classification of liability for incorrect disclosures to the capital markets as 
tort law, Assmann and Schütze (2015), § 7, para. 24; Ringe and Hellgardt (2009), pp 809–810, whereas 
others favour an autonomous classification that relies on the market place where the securities are traded 
and that has been affected by the disclosure as the relevant connecting factor, Eidenmüller (2004), § 4, 
para. 36; Grundmann (1990); Hopt (1991), para. 238.
103 C-375/13 Harald Kolassa v. Barclays Bank plc, ECLI:EU:C:2015:37.
104 Ibid., para. 44.
105 Brussels Regulation, Art. 5(3) (now Art. 7(2) Brussels Regulation Recast).
106 The Court of Justice interprets the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ as covering ‘both the 
place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, so that the defendant may 
be sued, at the option of the applicant, in the courts for either of those places’, Case C-360/12 Coty Ger-
many v. First Note Perfumes, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1318, para. 46. Where incorrect information is dissemi-
nated to the market, the harmful event takes place not necessarily where the investors who have suffered 
a loss are domiciled, but where ‘the decisions regarding the arrangements for the investments […] and 
the contents of the relevant prospectuses were taken […] or [where the incorrect] prospectuses were orig-
inally drafted and distributed’, Kolassa (n. 103), para. 53.
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II Regulation,107 the underlying policy objectives of both provisions are similar, 
namely (here) to strengthen the protection of investors in all markets that have been 
targeted by the issuer of the incorrect statement.108
Likewise, there are good reasons to conclude that liability for entering into obli-
gations that a director knows the company will not be able to perform is governed by 
the lex loci delicti.109 The Court of Justice has not addressed the question directly, 
but in ÖFAB v. Frank Koot,110 a case concerning the demarcation between the Insol-
vency Regulation and the Brussels Regulation,111 the Court held that ‘matters relat-
ing to tort, delict or quasi delict’ in Article 7(2) of the Recast Brussels Regulation 
‘must be interpreted as [covering] actions such as those at issue in the main proceed-
ings brought by a creditor of a limited company seeking to hold liable a member 
of the board of directors of that company and one of its shareholders for the debts 
of that company, because they allowed that company to continue to carry on busi-
ness even though it was undercapitalised and was forced to go into liquidation.’112 
The fact that the liability provision at issue was laid down in Swedish company law 
was irrelevant to the Court’s finding that special jurisdiction in matters regarding 
tort existed. Conversely, where a Member State relies on provisions of general tort 
law for the regulation of directors’ duties, these rules would nevertheless need to be 
characterised as company law.
In some of the cases outlined in the preceding paragraphs, a characterisation as 
tort law can have severe consequences. Since the applicable law pursuant to the 
Rome II Regulation is the lex loci damni and not the lex loci delicti commissi (unless 
the escape clause of Article 4(3) Rome II can be invoked), directors potentially face 
liability pursuant to a multitude of ill-aligned legal systems. For example, where the 
directors continue to trade in violation of legal obligations and creditors enter into 
contracts with the company, the damage occurs in all countries from which goods 
107 Rome II Regulation, Art. 4(1): ‘the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in 
which the event giving rise to the damage occurred’, i.e. leading to an application of the lex damni.
108 C-168/02 Rudolf Kronhofer v. Marianne Maier [2004] ECR I-6009, para. 20; Kolassa (n. 103), para. 
56 (both dealing with the Brussels Regulation); and recital 16 of the Rome II Regulation.
109 A more problematic case is the liability of directors or other corporate insiders for operating an 
undercapitalised company that eventually fails, with the consequence that the creditors cannot realise 
their claims. In some Member States, creditors can bring an action in tort to claim damages, under cer-
tain conditions, from the corporate insiders in such a situation. See, for example, the decision of the 
Dutch Hoge Raad (Supreme Court of Justice) of 6 October 1989, NJ 1990/286 (Beklamel). Creditors 
were able to rely on the general tort law provision in the Dutch Civil Code, Art. 6:162, where a company 
had incurred additional obligations at a time when the director knew, or reasonably should have known, 
that the company would not be able to meet the obligations and the company’s assets would not be suf-
ficient to satisfy all claims of the creditors. It has been suggested that liability in such a case should be 
governed by the lex loci delicti (European Group for Private International Law, Draft Rules on the Law 
Applicable to Companies and other Bodies, recital to Art. 1(2)(a), reproduced by Garcimartin (2016), 
p 27), while others argue that the consequences of forming and operating a company without sufficient 
capitalisation are part of the general rules on capital structure and hence of the lex societatis, Ego (2017), 
para. 424.
110 See n. 53 above.
111 For the facts, see n. 53. On the relationship between these two instruments, see also n. 32 above.
112 ÖFAB v. Frank Koot (n. 53), para. 42.
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are delivered or funds are transferred to the company.113 This seems to run coun-
ter to the goal of the Rome II Regulation to ‘ensure a reasonable balance between 
the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person who has sustained 
damage’.114
The second approach, which defines the lex societatis by asking whether an act 
involves the exercise of corporate power, will in many cases lead to the same result 
as the first approach. Again, the boundaries between the lex societatis and the lex 
loci delicti commissi may shift from one Member State to another, since the test 
depends on how the scope of corporate power is defined in the Member States’ com-
pany laws. Developing an autonomous definition of ‘exercise of corporate power’ 
will be difficult because of the inherent ambivalence of the term and the fact that the 
extent of corporate power is a function of unharmonised aspects of internal com-
pany law. Furthermore, if the criterion was interpreted as implying that directors 
must have acted within the scope of actual powers conferred on them, it would fall 
short of capturing some situations that are part of core company law, for example a 
breach of the duty to act within powers.115
The third approach encroaches furthest on the rule-making authority of the home 
state. While a distinction according to the type of injured party (and presumably 
also according to the type of loss suffered)116 has the advantage of presenting a 
relatively clear criterion that allows a functional demarcation between the lex soci-
etatis and the lex loci delicti commissi independent of the internal delineation of 
company law and tort law,117 it would allow Member States to bring a provision 
113 Stone (2018), para. 17.50, with references. The places where the creditor’s assets are located or 
where the creditor is domiciled, on the other hand, are irrelevant, see Kronhofer (n. 108), paras. 19–21.
114 Rome II Regulation, Recital 16. It has also been argued that the rules on international jurisdiction, 
which often lead to the availability of multiple forums, deter companies from making use of their free 
movement rights, Dammann (2008), pp 1875–1885. In addition to special jurisdiction in matters of tort 
law pursuant to Art. 7(2) Brussels Regulation Recast, companies may be sued where they are domiciled, 
understood as the place where their statutory seat, central administration of principal place of business is 
located, Arts. 4(1), 63 Brussels Regulation Recast.
115 UK Companies Act, s. 171.
116 Characterising a harmful act as company law or tort law solely on the basis of who has been injured 
would not always lead to convincing results. For example, it is well established in the Member States that 
a director who misrepresents facts in disclosures to investors who purchase or sell the company’s shares 
as a consequence of the misrepresentation is liable to the investors under tort law, see, for example, in 
Germany BGHZ 160, 134 (Infomatec I); BGHZ 160, 149 (Infomatec II); and in France Cass. com., 22 
November 2005 (Sté Eurodirect marketing c/Pfeiffer), RTD com. 2006, p 445. In order to determine 
whether a shareholder claim falls within the scope of the lex societatis or the lex loci delicti commissi, 
it is therefore necessary to rely on additional criteria. In national company law, it is common to distin-
guish between a loss suffered as a consequence of the invasion of an individual right and a loss that is 
only a reflection of the loss incurred by the company (reflective loss, see nn. 93–94 above). Sharehold-
ers and third parties are in the same position where an individual right of the former has been invaded, 
and presumably the policy decisions underlying the relevant liability provisions of internal law will take 
account of the difference in the position of shareholders (and non-shareholders) in such cases on the one 
hand, and shareholders suffering a reflective loss on the other. Characterisation in private international 
law should accordingly follow a similar distinction.
117 It also seems to be the preferred solution of the European Group for Private International Law 
(GEDIP), which has developed draft rules for a regulation harmonising the law applicable to companies 
in the EU. The draft rules provide that ‘liability in tort of the members and directors of a company vis à 
vis third parties’ shall be excluded from the scope of a possible regulation, Art. 1(2)(a) Draft Rules on 
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designed to regulate the behaviour of company directors relatively easily within the 
reach of host state law (where injured parties are located)118 by formulating direc-
tors’ duties broadly and stipulating that the duties are owed not only to the com-
pany and shareholders, but also to third parties. The host state could accordingly 
impose part of its liability regime on the directors of foreign companies operating 
within its territory in order to protect company outsiders. For example, a formula-
tion of directors’ duties as in the French Code de commerce, which provides that 
directors shall be liable ‘to the company or third parties either for infringements of 
the laws or regulations applicable to public limited companies, or for breaches of 
the memorandum and articles of association, or for management mistakes’119 would 
presumably need to be characterised as tort law according to the third approach in 
cases where the claimant is a third party.120 To what extent such a characterisation 
leads to overreaching host state law depends crucially on the conditions that give 
rise to liability under national law. Pursuant to the current situation in France, liabil-
ity towards third parties (understood as not including the shareholders) requires a 
so-called faute séparable des fonctions (a fault separable from the functions of the 
defendant director). Faute séparable was described by the Cour de Cassation as ‘an 
intentional fault of a particular gravity that is incompatible with the normal exercise 
of the director’s corporate functions’.121 This can arguably be equated with a tortious 
act and may, therefore, be held to justify a characterisation as tort law. However, 
hypothetically, a Member State may design a liability provision more widely and 
grant third parties the right to claim compensation for any loss suffered as a result, 
for example, of negligent management mistakes. Thus, it is clear that this approach 
to characterisation leads to a potentially broad scope of application of host state law, 
including in matters that fall within core areas of managerial activity, such as the 
approval of the company’s accounts.122 In addition, if a third party sues, two or more 
Footnote 117 (continued)
the Law Applicable to Companies and other Bodies. On the proposal, see Garcimartin (2016). A recital 
to the proposed regulation would clarify that the exclusion applied to liability ‘in particular resulting 
from misrepresentation or undercapitalization’, which would instead be governed by the Rome II Regu-
lation, Garcimartin (2016), p 27. Thus, the proposal envisages a bright line rule that includes liability 
towards the company and shareholders (Art. 5(g) Draft Rules) and excludes liability towards third par-
ties. The rules do not distinguish between direct and indirect (reflective) loss, but shareholders would 
always be qualified as parties governed by the lex societatis and never as third parties.
118 Art. 4(1) Rome II Regulation.
119 Code de commerce, Art. L225–251 (emphasis added).
120 However, French courts do not follow this approach and characterise Art. L225–251 Code de com-
merce as company law, irrespective of the claimant, see Cass. civ. 1ère, 1 July 1997 (Africatour), Bull. 
Joly Sociétés 1997, p 1062, note M. Menjucq (holding that Senegalese law applied to the liability of 
directors of a Senegalese company towards third parties).
121 Cass. com., 20 May 2003 (Sté d’application de techniques de l’industrie (SATI)), Bull. Joly Sociétés 
2003, p 786.
122 Indeed, in more recent case law, the French courts have indicated that an action may constitute a 
faute séparable where directors exercise their corporate powers, for example to approve financial 
accounts that are materially misleading, Cass. com., 10 February 2009, appeal no 07-20445 (Société 
de gestion Pierre Cardin c/Société MMS International). Thus, if characterisation based on the type of 
injured party became the prevalent approach in the EU to distinguish between the lex societatis and the 
lex loci delicti commissi, French liability rules in the Code de commerce would have broad application, 
including in cases where a foreign company operated in France and caused a loss to French residents.
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liability regimes may apply cumulatively, namely the incorporation state’s company 
law and the tort laws of all countries where the damage occurs, thus possibly result-
ing in overregulation and overdeterrence.
2.2.2  Liability of Shareholders for Obligations of the Company
In most Member States, the liability of the shareholders for the obligations of the 
company (piercing the corporate veil) is characterised as part of the lex societatis.123 
However, conceptually, it is not evident why a classification as company law is 
always the most appropriate solution, and it is indeed possible to find differing views 
in some Member States and in the academic literature, which suggest a classification 
as tort law or insolvency law.124
Considering the criteria established by the Court of Justice to delineate the lex 
societatis, lex concursus and neighbouring legal areas, it becomes clear that a uni-
form approach to characterising veil piercing is inadequate, but it is rather necessary 
to distinguish according to the precise structure, operation and function of individ-
ual veil piercing mechanisms that can be found in the Member States. For example, 
veil piercing according to English law generally applies only in the limited circum-
stances where ‘a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject 
to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement 
he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his control’.125 This 
123 See Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2019), Part 1, para. 89.
124 See, for example, Calliess (2015), Article 1 Rome II, para. 52 (arguing that piercing the corporate 
veil should be classified as ‘a general problem of (tort) law’ and should, therefore, be covered by Rome 
II). In the Czech Republic, persons (other than directors) who use their influence over the company’s 
directors in a way that results in damage to the company’s creditors are liable pursuant to s. 71(3) Busi-
ness Corporations Act. It is not clear whether this liability should be classified as company law or tort 
law, but it has been pointed out that it is in character closer to a civil wrong than an obligation under 
company law, Pauknerová and Brodec (2019), Part 2 VI, paras. 62–63. Controversial is also the charac-
terisation of the German doctrine of causing a company’s insolvency (Existenzvernichtung). The basis 
for the liability of the shareholders pursuant to this doctrine can be found in tort law. In the case law, 
there is some indication that veil piercing falls within the scope of the lex societatis. In a case dealing 
both with ‘traditional’ veil piercing, the liability of the shareholder for the obligations of the company, 
and in a case dealing with what can be called ‘reverse veil piercing’, the liability of a company for claims 
against the sole shareholder, which the shareholder sought to evade by forming the company and trans-
ferring assets to that company, the German Federal Court of Justice argued that the liability of the share-
holders and the company, respectively, were questions of the reach and meaning of the legal personality 
of the company (BGH, judgment of 11 July 1957, WM 1957, 1047, at D I; BGH, judgment of 5 Novem-
ber 1980, BGHZ 78, 318, at III 2 b). They were therefore part of the governing law of the legal person. 
Whether this jurisprudence can be transposed to the case of liability for causing the company’s insol-
vency is not clear. The liability of the shareholder exists since BGHZ 173, 246 (Trihotel), which intro-
duced a change in the case law, in relation to the company; creditors do not have a direct claim. The doc-
trine is thus comparable to causes of action of a company against a director who makes payments in the 
vicinity of insolvency that have been characterised as insolvency law by the Court of Justice (for exam-
ple, the cause of action discussed in Kornhaas (n. 39). Accordingly, some commentators favour a similar 
classification of the doctrine of causing a company’s insolvency, while others submit that the doctrine is 
tortious in nature, and yet others that it is part of the lex societatis. An overview of the debate with refer-
ences is given by Ego (2017), paras. 418–420. Case law dealing with the question does not exist.
125 Petrodel Resources Ltd v. Prest [2013] 2 AC 415, 488.
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formulation shows that the principle does not constitute a derogation from ordinary 
civil and commercial law within the meaning of Gourdain v. Nadler.126 Rather, its 
aim is to provide a legal response to abuses of the principles of limited liability and 
separate legal personality generally.127 However, applying the approaches to distin-
guishing between the lex societatis and the lex loci delicti described above when we 
discussed the liability of directors, a characterisation as company law is also by no 
means clear. Often, veil piercing cases do not involve a breach of company law or an 
exercise of corporate power, but the disregard or evasion of other applicable rules 
and regulations, which renders the above criteria ill-suited to identify the boundaries 
of the lex societatis and lex loci delicti.
In comparison, causing a company’s insolvency under German law (Existenzver-
nichtung),128 which is commonly described as a case of veil piercing (Durchgriffs-
haftung),129 applies to the specific case of shareholders entering into a transaction 
(or otherwise transferring assets out of the reach of the creditors) in order to benefit 
certain parties to the detriment of the creditors as a whole and in the knowledge that 
the action may lead to the company’s insolvency.130 As a consequence, the share-
holders are liable to the company for the loss caused by their actions. Given that the 
company is the claimant, the liability claim will generally be enforced by the liqui-
dator after insolvency proceedings have been opened. Thus, the situation is similar 
to that of any other legal mechanism imposing liability on directors for acting in a 
manner that causes a loss to the company’s creditors at a time when the directors 
knew or should have known that their action would cause or aggravate the com-
pany’s insolvency. The German doctrine should accordingly be classified similarly 
for purposes of private international law, namely as insolvency law.131
2.3  Outreach Statutes
Where a jurisdiction applies so-called outreach statutes, it does not generally call 
into question, as a matter of private international law, the applicability of foreign 
company law rules to an entity incorporated abroad. Instead, outreach statutes can, 
first, apply specifically to (pseudo-)foreign companies, so as to prevent an unwanted 
regulatory outcome which would otherwise result from the acceptance of a foreign 
lex societatis for companies operating in, or interacting with, the economy of the 
host state. In the context of EU Company Law, the most famous example of such 
an outreach statute is, of course, the Dutch Law on Formally Foreign Companies, 
126 See Sect. 2.1 above.
127 Davies and Worthington (2012), para. 8–4.
128 See n. 124 above.
129 Raiser and Veil (2015), § 39/24.
130 See for example BGHZ 151, 181 (KBV).
131 Krawczyk-Giehsmann (2019), pp 18–20 comes to the same conclusion.
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which was at the centre of the Inspire Art case and was held to constitute a restric-
tion on the freedom of establishment that could not be justified.132
Outreach statutes have also been discussed in the context of regulatory competi-
tion in the United States. As examined in another contribution to this special issue, 
California imposes a number of mandatory corporate law rules on foreign compa-
nies with significant economic ties with California, including rules on the election 
and removal of directors, directors’ liability, certain shareholder rights, and recently 
mandatory gender quotas for directors of public companies. The legality of these 
attempts to deviate from the internal affairs doctrine is hotly debated in the US lit-
erature, and some courts have rejected the applicability of California’s corporate law 
to companies not chartered there.133
A second, wider category of rules that can be viewed as outreach statutes does not 
specifically apply to foreign companies, but rather to all entities operating134 in the 
host state. Such rules will typically have the same effect as host state rules targeted 
specifically at (pseudo-)foreign companies where they concern questions addressed 
at least in part by the company law of the host state, and will thus apply in addition 
to the lex societatis. Outreach statutes in this second, wider sense typically apply to 
foreign companies because the legal mechanism they promulgate is formally part 
of another legal area, for example administrative law in cases where enforcement is 
through a government agency, or capital markets regulation where the company’s 
securities are listed on a domestic stock exchange.135 Unless the host state attempts 
to impose additional requirements only on foreign companies, going beyond the 
requirements set for companies formed under its own laws, the difference between 
the two types of outreach statutes is however merely one of legislative technique.136
Outreach statutes of both types that restrict a company’s freedom of establish-
ment may of course be justified under Gebhard, as is, presumably, the case in the 
fairly widespread practice among Member States of applying domestic director 
disqualification rules to foreign companies operating within their jurisdiction.137 
132 Other outreach statutes remain in force in EU Member States and have not (yet) been challenged 
before the Court of Justice. See for instance the Belgian rules on the liability of branch managers, which 
for pseudo-foreign companies effectively results in an outreach application of Belgian director liability 
rules to foreign entities, Maresceau and Van der Elst (2019), Part 2 II.
133 Fisch and Davidoff Solomon (2019). On these questions, see also Kersting (2002).
134 The exact connecting factor for outreach statutes of this second type may, of course, take many differ-
ent shapes.
135 Outreach statutes in a narrow sense, but not so much those in a wider sense, will often rely on over-
riding mandatory provisions to protect public interests of general importance. They may accordingly 
be part of a country’s ordre public. For an overview of relevant statutes in the EU Member States that 
are regarded as forming part of a country’s ordre public see Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2019), Part 1, paras. 
94–99.
136 The host state can choose between characterising a given requirement as company law in its internal 
law, and then replicate this requirement for (some) foreign companies (thus creating an outreach statute 
of the first type), or alternatively enact the legal requirement in question outside of its internal company 
law, rendering it applicable to all companies with the relevant connection to the host state.
137 See Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2019), Part 1, para. 56, Table 3.2, for an overview of the prevalence of 
such rules.
452 C. Gerner-Beuerle et al.
123
Moreover, Kornhaas138 raises the question whether justification is in fact necessary 
where the outreach statute in question does not directly affect a company’s ability 
to establish itself in the host state.139 One may speculate whether the Court is more 
likely to reach this conclusion in case of the second, wider type of outreach stat-
ute. As in the other areas described above, the ability of Member States to impose 
additional requirements on foreign companies through the use of outreach statutes is 
likely to reduce the extent to which an exercise of the choice of lex societatis ena-
bled by Centros effectively changes the legal requirements of a company compared 
to an incorporation in the real seat Member State.
2.4  Employees and Defensive Company Law Harmonisation
At least for large companies and corporate groups, the area which would perhaps 
offer the greatest incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage in Europe relates to 
board-level employee participation.140 Whether affording employees the right to 
appoint board members (or otherwise141 influence board composition) creates 
value overall is of course hard to ascertain empirically.142 Likewise, the distribu-
tional effects of employee participation arrangements for the providers of capital 
and labour are notoriously hard to measure.143 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the social 
optimality of employee participation arrangements continues to be a contested 
question.144
Irrespective of the overall ex ante value effects of employee participation, how-
ever, shareholders should be expected to potentially benefit significantly from a uni-
lateral right to remove existing protections implicitly provided to employees through 
employee participation arrangements. As highlighted by Gelter,145 the ability to dis-
apply employee participation ex post introduces a significant scope for opportunis-
tic behaviour by shareholders and firms. To the extent that employee participation 
arrangements can be regarded as akin to insurance schemes, with employees accept-
ing lower wages in return for a higher degree of job security,146 it is obvious that 
the potential for a unilateral withdrawal of the very mechanism creating the benefit 
for employees can result in a value transfer from employees to shareholders. From a 
more dynamic viewpoint, a firm’s ability to unilaterally change employee participa-
tion rights should in the longer term remove any potential benefits from having these 
138 See n. 39 above.
139 See also Sect. 3 below.
140 See on this topic in detail Gelter (2009).
141 For an overview of mechanisms in the Member States see e.g. Gerner-Beuerle et  al. (2013), 
Table 2.3.a. France has also subsequently adopted employee participation rules for its largest companies; 
see Gerner-Beuerle and Schillig (2019), pp 463–464.
142 See e.g. Adams et al. (2010); Davies (2015).
143 See the discussion in Gelter (2009), pp 804–805.
144 See e.g. Davies (2015); see also the discussion in Adams et al. (2010) and Kim et al. (2018).
145 Note 140 above.
146 See Kim et al. (2018).
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arrangements in the first place, whether or not the firm actually engages in opportun-
istic behaviour.147
Since the decision in Centros only concerned choice of law at the point of incor-
poration, it did not directly enable ex post choice of law—and thus opportunistic 
behaviour of firms vis-à-vis their employees. The decisions that followed, however, 
confirmed the right of companies to change the applicable law ex post.148 The two 
main ways in which ex post choice can be exercised by companies is by way of 
cross-border mergers and by outright incorporations.
Both of these operations constitute exercises of the freedom of establishment 
according to the CJEU’s jurisprudence,149 thereby limiting the ways in which the 
state of emigration can seek to preserve the continued application of its rules due 
to the strict justification requirements existing under EU law.150 This may be of par-
ticular relevance in the context of employee participation: it is unclear and, it is sub-
mitted, doubtful, whether a legal requirement to preserve board-level employee par-
ticipation, enacted on the Member State level, could pass the Gebhard test.151 This 
is partly due to the uncertain nature of the benefits, and indeed the precise aims, 
of mandatory employee participation rules.152 The fact that employee participa-
tion arrangements can often be sidestepped even within the jurisdictions mandating 
them153 casts further doubts on the justifiability of an insistence by a host state on 
the continued application of its rules following a cross-border reorganisation. Con-
sequently, the choice of law created by the CJEU’s case law could have created a 
significant incentive for regulatory arbitrage, and thus corporate movement, in the 
area of employee participation.
In reality, however, we observe only very limited regulatory arbitrage around the 
area of employee participation. There are two principal reasons for the lack of cor-
porate movement away from Member States mandating employee participation.
First, in relation to cross-border mergers, the Member States agreed to ‘defen-
sively’ harmonise the rules governing this type of transaction in a way that preserved 
existing employee participation arrangements in the vast majority of cases in which 
abandoning them could benefit firms or their shareholders. There does not necessar-
ily exist a clear legal basis for concluding that restrictions of fundamental freedoms 
in secondary EU law can be justified in situations where the same restriction enacted 
by a Member State could not.154 However, at least as a matter of fact, the rules pro-
tecting employee participation in cross-border mergers,155 which are based on the 
147 Gelter (2009), p 856.
148 See in particular SEVIC Systems, the much discussed obiter in para. 112 of Cartesio, as well as the 
decisions in VALE and most recently Polbud.
149 See SEVIC Systems and Polbud (cross-border mergers) and VALE (re-incorporations).
150 See below, Sect. 3.
151 See immediately below, Sect. 3.
152 See also Gelter (2009), pp 817–818 and the literature cited there.
153 See, for example, the study by Bayer (2016).
154 On this point see also Ringe (2007), p 192.
155 See Directive 2005/56/EC, now consolidated into Title II, Chapter II of Directive (EU) 2017/1132.
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SE Model,156 have not been challenged, and are unlikely to be called into question 
by the Court. This defensive harmonisation, which had already been enacted by the 
time the decision in SEVIC Systems157 was delivered, precluded significant corpo-
rate movement motivated by employee participation arbitrage.158
Second, in relation to cross-border reincorporations, the mere confirmation in 
VALE and National Grid Indus that such transactions generally fall within the scope 
of the freedom of establishment ultimately does little to facilitate corporate mobility. 
Reincorporations are complex transactions, and the CJEU did not, and could not, 
create a viable legal framework for their implementation.159 In fact, despite the clear 
jurisprudence of the Court, several Member States still do not permit reincorpora-
tions at all,160 and even the company at issue in VALE ultimately failed to reincor-
porate successfully.161 We are thus likely to only see companies make use of the 
mobility afforded by these decisions once a directive on cross-border reincorpora-
tions—which has already been on and off the EU legislative agenda for decades162—
is finally adopted by the Member States. Unsurprisingly, a draft163 of this directive, 
which has now cleared most legislative hurdles, adopts essentially the same model 
for reincorporations as already applies to cross-border mergers and in relation to SE 
formations.
3  Limited Review of National Legislative Authority
The preceding analysis, which has identified large areas of law that are removed 
from the lex societatis and governed by the law of a country or region affected by 
a company’s business activities, and the tentative conclusion that this fragmenta-
tion and de-fictionalisation of connecting factors in the EU significantly impedes 
regulatory competition and corporate mobility, only holds true if deviations from 
the registered office as the relevant connecting factor and the intervention of host 
state law are compatible with the free movement rights afforded to companies by 
156 See Art. 133 of Directive (EU) 2017/1132, referring to Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 
2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees.
157 Note 2 above.
158 While Gelter (2009) is undoubtedly correct to point out that the protection afforded by the Cross-
Border Merger Directive as well as the SE Regulation leaves room for opportunism by shareholders, it is 
argued that implementing the arrangements necessary to take advantage of these ‘loopholes’ is likely to 
prove costly, both directly and reputationally, for companies. This is in some ways similar to the situation 
within some Member States, where strategies for circumventing mandatory employee participation laws 
are often widely known, but are rarely used in practice for fear of reputational costs and due to the poten-
tial impact on the relationship with (organised) labour.
159 See e.g. European Commission (DG Market), Feedback statement, Summary of responses to the pub-
lic consultation on Cross-border transfers of registered offices of companies, September 2013.
160 See Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2019), Part 1, paras. 109–112, and, for more details, also Gerner-Beuerle 
et al. (2018b).
161 See Lombardo and Mucciarelli (2019), Part 2 XV.
162 See for a recent overview e.g. Panizza (2017).
163 See Proposal for a Directive amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conver-
sions, mergers and divisions, COM(2018) 241.
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the Treaty. In principle, once it is established that a certain activity falls within the 
scope of a free movement right and a measure of national law is ‘liable to hinder or 
make less attractive’164 the exercise of the right of establishment, the national meas-
ure must be justified by imperative requirements in the public interest. Furthermore, 
the national measure must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, it must be 
suitable to achieve the objective that it pursues and not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to attain it (Gebhard test).165 The Gebhard test has proved to be demanding; 
it requires the host state to show that the imposition of its own law is both sufficient 
to address the perceived shortcomings of the home state law, and, effectively, that 
the host state rule in question is optimal in the sense that no other, less intrusive 
remedy is available. In a complex and interconnected area such as company law, the 
host state is unlikely to succeed in this endeavour, as demonstrated by the case law 
discussed above.
In the present context, which concerns the simultaneous application of competing 
legal regimes as a result of different connecting factors, limited guidance exists on 
the question of whether and how the Gebhard test applies. The only decision of the 
Court of Justice that addresses the question at any length, Kornhaas, indicates that a 
Gebhard justification is not required. The Court distinguished Kornhaas from Über-
seering and Inspire Art and held that, in contrast to these two cases, the provision of 
German law at issue in the proceedings166 concerned ‘in no way […] the formation 
of a company in a given Member State or its subsequent establishment in another 
Member State, to the extent that [it] […] is applicable only after that company has 
been formed, in connection with its business, and more specifically, either from the 
time when it must be considered, pursuant to the national law applicable under Arti-
cle 4 of Regulation No 1346/2000 [now Article 7 Insolvency Regulation 2015], to 
be insolvent, or from the time when its over-[in]debtedness is recognised in accord-
ance with that national law’.167 Because of its remoteness from the act of corporate 
formation or the transfer of a company’s seat to another Member State, and thus an 
immediate cross-border transaction, the Court concluded that the German provision 
did not affect freedom of establishment.
Some commentators have interpreted Kornhaas as meaning that measures appli-
cable in the vicinity of insolvency do not constitute restrictions on the exercise of 
freedom of establishment.168 Others argue, more generally, that duties and liabil-
ity provisions that find their legal basis in insolvency or tort law,169 or any credi-
tor protection law that does not directly relate to the company’s incorporation, fall 
outside the scope of freedom of establishment.170 Going even further, it has been 
suggested that the right of establishment generally only captures ‘corporate matters’, 
164 Inspire Art (n. 2), para. 133.
165 Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano 
[1995] ECR I-4165, para. 37.
166 Section 64 sentence 1 Limited Liability Companies Act, see n. 39 above.
167 Kornhaas (n. 39), para. 28.
168 Armour et al. (2017), p 228.
169 Teichmann and Wolff (2019), pp 254–255.
170 Lindemans (2016), p 877.
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in particular rules relating to a company’s internal governance structure and capital 
requirements. According to this view, host states could impose any provision on for-
eign companies that was not classified as company law without coming into conflict 
with the right of establishment.171 Yet others regard Kornhaas as a misguided deci-
sion that is ‘so downright odd that it deserves to be locked into a secure container, 
plunged into the icy waters of a deep lake and forgotten about’.172 Kornhaas, it is 
argued, introduced a form of Keck test by distinguishing between rules of the host 
Member State that related to the conduct of a company’s business, which were out-
side the scope of the right of establishment, and ‘rules that affect the process of set-
ting up the establishment itself’, which constituted a restriction that had to be justi-
fied pursuant to the Gebhard formula.173 This distinction, it is further submitted, was 
difficult to reconcile with both the formulation of Article 49 TFEU and prior case 
law analysing the rule-making authority of a host state, notably Inspire Art, which 
seemed to imply that the Treaty’s protections were not confined to the act of set-
ting up a company.174 Rather, the application of any provision of host state law that 
rendered the exercise of the right of establishment less attractive had to be justified 
under Gebhard.175
It is correct that the Keck test has given rise to its own problems of demarcation 
and the Court has been reluctant to transpose it to areas other than the free move-
ment of goods.176 Nevertheless, Keck, and similarly Kornhaas, reflect the need to 
correct the overly broad construction of the scope of the market freedoms in the case 
law of the Court of Justice beginning with Dassonville.177 Corrections at the level of 
justification, while certainly possible, would not be conducive to legal certainty. For 
example, it could be argued that the application of a legal mechanism characterized 
as insolvency law for purposes of private international law to a company with its 
registered office in a different state than its centre of main interest was necessary in 
171 Devine (2018), p 4, fn. 29.
172 Ringe (2017), p 279 (quoting Weatherill (2014)).
173 Ibid., pp 270, 278. See also Armour (2005), p 405; Enriques and Gelter (2006), p 450; Ringe (2008), 
p 609 (arguing that insolvency law rules that have more than an indirect and uncertain impact on the 
exercise of the freedom of establishment must be justified under Gebhard).
174 Ringe (2017), pp 276–277 quotes Art. 49 TFEU, which provides that the freedom of establishment 
‘shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and man-
age undertakings’ (emphases added by Ringe), and Inspire Art (n. 2), para. 99, where the Court rejected 
the argument that the Dutch pseudo-foreign company regime did not infringe the right of establishment 
because ‘foreign companies [were] fully recognised in the Netherlands and [were] not refused registra-
tion in that Member State’s business register, [the challenged Dutch law] having the effect simply of lay-
ing down a number of additional obligations classified as administrative’.
175 Ringe (2017), p 277 proposes to solve the conflict between freedom of establishment and regulatory 
intervention by the state where the COMI is located by aligning the connecting factors of company and 
insolvency law and replacing the COMI as currently defined in the Insolvency Regulation with the regis-
tered office or place of incorporation.
176 However, the Court referred to Keck regularly in its ‘golden shares’ decisions, e.g. Case C-463/00 
Commission v. Spain [2003] ECR I-4581, paras. 58-62; Case C-98/01 Commission v. United Kingdom 
[2003] ECR I-4641 (BAA), paras. 45-47; Case C-171/08 Commission v. Portugal [2010] I-6817 (Portu-
gal Telecom), paras. 65-67; Case C-543/08 Commission v. Portugal [2010] ECR I-11241 (EDP), paras. 
65–68.
177 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.
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order to protect the company’s creditors, since the corresponding legal mechanism 
in the insolvency law of the home Member State (where the registered office of the 
company is located) did not apply. However, this line of reasoning presupposes that 
the applicable law of the home Member State (the lex societatis and possibly other 
legal areas) did not contain a functionally comparable mechanism that protected 
creditors sufficiently well. Thus, the Gebhard test would require a highly complex 
(and, arguably, subjective) analysis involving the identification of functional sub-
stitutes and an assessment of their comparative effectiveness. Such a view would 
also suggest that the compatibility of a restrictive national measure with the Treaty 
would ultimately depend on the specific Member State pairing in question. Further-
more, the assessment would have to change in response to changes to the relevant 
legal rules in either of the jurisdictions concerned.
Assuming that it is, therefore, preferable to introduce necessary corrections by 
delimiting the scope of the right of establishment, the next question is how workable 
criteria can be developed that do not suffer from the same uncertainties that afflict 
the Keck test. Restricting the right of establishment to provisions ‘belonging’ to 
company law (in some sense of the word, for example within the meaning of private 
international law) is in conflict with well-established case law of the Court of Justice 
holding that the right of establishment prohibits company law as well as non-com-
pany law restrictions, for example exit taxes, and difficult to justify from a policy 
perspective.178 Similarly, the view that creditor protection rules are generally outside 
the scope of the freedom of establishment, provided they do not directly relate to 
a company’s incorporation,179 is most likely broader than what the Court intended 
to say in Kornhaas, where it required a certain (albeit badly defined) remoteness 
between the formation of the company and the point in time when the national meas-
ure in question begins to operate. In addition, it would give rise to difficult boundary 
questions, since many creditor protection rules operate throughout the existence of a 
company by shaping incentives and deterring particular types of behaviour.
178 Case C-9/02 Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de 
l’Industrie [2004] ECR I-2409; Case C-446/03 Marks and Spencer plc v. David Halsey (HM’s Inspector 
of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-10837. Some Member State courts, however, seem to have adopted the view-
point that provisions not classified as company law for purposes of conflict of laws do not fall within the 
scope of Arts. 49 and 54 TFEU, see BGH NJW 2007, 1529 (Einfamilienhaus); OLG Rostock, GmbHR 
2010, 1349. These cases concerned the liability of directors of foreign limited companies who had acted 
on behalf of their companies without making sufficiently clear that a legal person with limited liability 
was one of the contracting parties (notably by failing to use the addition ‘ltd.’ or a similar designation 
after the company name). The courts argued that German law was applicable because liability was not 
based on the position of the director as a corporate organ or the violation of company law duties, but on a 
quasi-contractual legal mechanism: the creation of the false legal appearance that a person with unlimited 
liability would be a party to the contract (analogy to s. 179 German Civil Code, a provision of agency 
law that provides for the liability of an agent who acts without authority). In such a case, the relevant 
connecting factor is the place where the false legal appearance was created and had an effect on third par-
ties (see BGHZ 43, 21, 27). Imposing liability on the acting director who failed to use the required desig-
nation was not seen as a restriction because the type of liability at issue ‘did not fall within the scope of 
the lex societatis and, hence, did not concern the right of establishment’, BGH NJW 2007, 1529, para. 10 
(own translation).
179 See n. 170.
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The first view mentioned above, excluding measures applicable in the vicinity 
of insolvency from the scope of the Treaty,180 is closest to the ruling in Kornhaas, 
where the Court explicitly referred to insolvency or the vicinity of insolvency as the 
relevant dividing line. However, as discussed in Sect. 2.1, measures may apply in 
the vicinity of insolvency that do not constitute a closely connected action and do 
not form part of the lex concursus as determined by Article 7(2) Insolvency Reg-
ulation. If they were excluded from the freedom of establishment, Member States 
could exploit gaps between the Insolvency Regulation and the right of establishment 
through an appropriate design of their internal law. A legal mechanism that achieves 
the desired regulatory outcome may be structured so that it does not fall within the 
definition of a closely connected action, while the necessary connecting factor is for-
mulated in a way that brings relevant business activity within the reach of host state 
law. A host state may then be able to apply its laws to a foreign company without the 
need for justification even in cases where the COMI is not located in that state. It is 
therefore more convincing to synchronise the international scope of application of 
the Insolvency Regulation and the scope of the right of establishment. A measure 
does not per se fall outside the scope of the freedom of establishment if it relates to 
activity in the vicinity of insolvency, but only if it is characterised as insolvency law 
pursuant to the Insolvency Regulation. This approach promotes legal certainty, since 
the international scope of the Insolvency Regulation is now relatively well defined, 
given the rich body of case law by the Court of Justice that exists on the question, 
whereas the term ‘vicinity of insolvency’ is not a well-established concept of EU 
law and would require further litigation in order to take on a precise meaning. It 
is also in line with Kornhaas, since the Court, in discussing which measures are 
excluded from the scope of the right of establishment, refers to companies that ‘must 
be considered, pursuant to the national law applicable under Article 4 of Regulation 
No 1346/2000 [Article 7 Insolvency Regulation 2015], to be insolvent, or [whose 
over-indebtedness] is recognised in accordance with that national law’.181
Conceptually, this approach can be understood as the apportionment of spheres of 
legislative or regulatory authority by the supranational legislator: for some matters 
(those falling within Article 7 Insolvency Regulation) to the Member State where 
the COMI is located, and for others (possibly those falling within the lex societatis, 
or more broadly any measure that determines how attractive an exercise of the right 
of establishment is,182 with the exception of those falling within Article 7 Insolvency 
Regulation)183 to the Member State where the registered office is located. Freedom 
of establishment must respect this apportionment of spheres of regulatory authority, 
since the allocation of rule-making power to the state of the COMI for measures 
characterised as insolvency law would be largely neutralised if these measures had 
to be justified under Gebhard. To put the same point slightly differently, it could be 
180 See n. 168.
181 Kornhaas (n. 39), para. 28 (emphases added).
182 See the definition of a restriction on the freedom of establishment, for example in Inspire Art (n. 2), 
para. 133.
183 On this question, see the discussion in the next paragraphs.
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argued that the conflict rules assign home state status to Member States for different 
regulatory spheres. As far as insolvency law (as defined in Article 7 Insolvency Reg-
ulation) is concerned, the Member State of the COMI is the home Member State, 
and as far as company law is concerned (or more generally, for other matters than 
insolvency law, see the following discussion), the Member State of the registered 
office is the home state.
If this interpretation is accepted, the question arises whether Kornhaas can be 
generalised, with the consequence that the regulatory sphere within which a Mem-
ber State can operate without the need for Gebhard justification is a function of the 
applicable rules of conflict of laws, or Kornhaas is limited to the interaction between 
freedom of establishment and insolvency law. In the former case, it would further-
more be necessary to consider whether conflict rules generally have the function 
of allocating regulatory spheres for purposes of determining the scope of freedom 
of establishment, or only some conflict rules have this function. For example, at 
one end of the spectrum of possible interpretations (albeit one that would require a 
change in the Court’s approach to construing freedom of establishment),184 it might 
be argued that the right of establishment, insofar as it was exercised by companies, 
only concerned national measures belonging to ‘company law’. The home state (the 
state under whose laws a company was initially formed) would then have regula-
tory authority over matters falling within the scope of the lex societatis (this would 
be the area ‘reserved’ for home state law, which could define the legal contours of 
companies as ‘creatures of the law’185 without further scrutiny under freedom of 
establishment), and host states over all other matters. Of course, there is no reason 
why the regulatory spheres of the home state and host states should be collectively 
exhaustive, and what falls outside the scope of home state control must be within 
the regulatory authority of the host state. Therefore, notwithstanding that it is well 
established that the home state’s reserved area does not go beyond company law,186 
host states may be required to provide Gebhard justification for both company and 
non-company law measures that make the exercise of the right of establishment 
less attractive. How far the requirement to justify non-company law matters reaches 
depends on the question posed above: whether, and which, uniform conflict rules 
184 See n. 178 above and the accompanying text.
185 Case 81/87 The Queen v. HM Treasury and Commissioners for Inland Revenue, ex p Daily Mail and 
General Trust plc [1988] ECR 5483, para. 19. Peculiarly, the provision at issue in Daily Mail, imposing 
an exit tax, did not belong to company law under any definition of the term. Later case law clarified that 
the ‘reserved area’ of the home Member State did not include tax law, see for example C-196/04 Cad-
bury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2006] 
ECR I-07995; C-371/10 National Grid Indus BV v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond/kantoor 
Rotterdam [2011] ECR I-12273.
186 Whether it relates only to certain aspects of company law is unclear. The Court of Justice has held 
that companies cannot rely on Arts. 49 and 54 TFEU to challenge measures of a Member State affecting 
the conditions required to retain the ‘status’ as a company incorporated under the law of that Member 
State, see Daily Mail (n. 185), para. 24; Cartesio (n. 2), para. 110; National Grid Indus (n. 185), paras. 
31–33. However, these cases arose in the context of a transfer of seat or place of management, where the 
legal personality of a company pursuant to the law of the Member State where it was incorporated was 
the main issue, and hence only limited guidance can be derived from them.
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exclude areas of regulation, such as insolvency law or tort law, from the scope of 
freedom of establishment.
In principle, EU regulations harmonising conflict rules, as all other acts by the 
EU institutions or Member States, have to comply with the Treaty and, therefore, 
need to be justified if they amount to a restriction on a fundamental freedom.187 
Given the wide formulation of what constitutes a restriction,188 it can be argued that 
all conflict rules that rely on a different connecting factor than the registered office 
and, accordingly, introduce regulatory requirements that apply in addition to a for-
eign lex societatis to companies established in another Member State, as well as the 
regulatory requirements applicable pursuant to the conflict rules, render the exer-
cise of the right of establishment less attractive and must pass the Gebhard test. 
However, as we said above, uniform conflict rules can be understood as apportion-
ing spheres of legislative or regulatory authority by a decision of a supranational 
rule-maker. Therefore, if a uniform conflict rule is justified under Gebhard, this may 
be held to apply also to any rule-making activity by a national legislator that falls 
within the confines of the conflict rule. Such rule-making activity, it could be said, 
requires no further Gebhard justification, since it is pursued within a ‘regulatory 
sphere’ that has been allocated by the EU legislator in compliance with the Treaty.
There are good reasons to assume that the conflict rule of Article 7 Insolvency 
Regulation does not fail the Gebhard test. While reliance on a connecting factor—
the centre of main interest—that is not aligned with the connecting factor that deter-
mines the lex societatis may lead to certain friction between company law and insol-
vency law, because two jurisdictions that may partially overlap or leave regulatory 
gaps apply to companies with their registered office and COMI in different Member 
States,189 the choice of COMI as a connecting factor is unlikely to be manifestly 
inappropriate or manifestly disproportionate within the meaning of the Court of Jus-
tice’s case law. First, it should be noted that the connecting factor for purposes of 
the applicable company law is not harmonised in the EU, and Member States would 
be able to eliminate any friction between company law and insolvency law, at least 
for companies incorporated under their own laws, by requiring, either in the form 
of a conflicts rule as a precondition for an application of their company law or as 
a requirement of internal company law, that domestic companies must have their 
real seat within the territory of the Member State.190 Secondly, the fact that certain 
measures that may be found in a Member State’s company law are excluded from 
187 The proportionality test that is part of Gebhard justification is, however, applied less intensively if 
EU institutions make discretionary policy choices involving complex political, economic and social con-
siderations, as will generally be the case when they make use of their legislative powers under the Treaty. 
In such cases, EU courts will only invalidate a legislative or administrative measure if it is manifestly 
inappropriate or manifestly disproportionate, considering the objective pursued by the measure. See, 
for example, C-491/01 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco 
(Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [2002] ECR I-11453, para. 123. For a detailed discussion 
and references, see also Craig (2012), pp 592–615.
188 See the text at n. 164 above.
189 See Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster (2014).
190 Such a requirement would not be in conflict with the Court’s case law on freedom of establishment, 
see Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2019), Part 1, paras. 45–47.
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the scope of freedom of establishment under Kornhaas because they are qualified as 
‘closely connected actions’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) Insolvency Regula-
tion should not be interpreted as an encroachment upon the legislative powers of 
the home Member State in company law matters. The right of establishment is not 
conceptualised in terms of determining which Member State has authority to regu-
late in matters of ‘company law’, but it prohibits any measure that is liable to render 
the exercise of the right of establishment less attractive. Thus, it is irrelevant that a 
Member State may regard a measure that satisfies the Gourdain v. Nadler conditions 
of a closely connected action as belonging to company law, and hence as suppos-
edly falling within the rule-making authority of the home Member State. Rather, the 
relevant question is whether the conflict rules that can be found in the Insolvency 
Regulation are designed in a way that is not manifestly inappropriate or dispropor-
tionate in achieving the objective of the rules. It is convincing to argue that this is 
the case, since the Gourdain v. Nadler conditions reflect considerations of proce-
dural efficiency.
Similar considerations apply to Rome II. We have said above that the dividing 
line between the lex societatis and the lex loci delicti commissi is not well developed 
at a supranational level, given the lack of case law by the Court of Justice on the 
matter. However, it is not manifestly inappropriate for an autonomous definition of 
the scope of the lex loci delicti commissi to capture provisions imposing liability on 
directors in cases where the substance of the matter is not related to directors’ duties 
under company law (even though a violation of applicable laws may also amount 
to a breach of directors’ duties), which is the essence of the first approach to dis-
tinguishing the lex societatis from the lex loci delicti commissi that we described 
above.191 Examples are incorrect disclosures in financial markets192 and the miscon-
duct of directors giving rise to liability in an action that would have been qualified 
as a closely connected action had it been brought by a liquidator193 (that is, the first 
of the Gourdain v. Nadler conditions—a derogation from the common rules of civil 
and commercial law—is satisfied, but not the third). In these cases, policy consid-
erations apply that are different from those underpinning general directors’ duties, 
notably the integrity of financial markets, the protection of investors in public mar-
kets, and the avoidance of risk shifting in the vicinity of insolvency, which justify 
a treatment of the respective liability actions in the same manner as other actions 
where these policy considerations are at the forefront.
In summary, the solution suggested here would result in a layered review of provi-
sions that have the potential to dissuade parties from exercising their right of estab-
lishment. First, provisions of national law adopted pursuant to a uniform conflicts 
rule that allocates regulatory authority to the respective Member State in compliance 
with the Treaty would not require justification (this is the Kornhaas scenario). Sec-
ondly, uniform conflict rules laid down in measures of EU law require justification, 
but with ‘low intensity review’ based on the criteria of manifest inappropriateness 
191 Text at nn. 95–112.
192 Kolassa (n. 103).
193 ÖFAB v. Frank Koot (n. 53).
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or disproportionality.194 Thirdly, outreach statutes, including any explicit or hidden 
conflict rule in national law that allows a Member State to apply the outreach statute 
to a foreign company, are subject to a full Gebhard review.
4  Conclusion
How much choice did the Centros line of cases actually provide to companies and 
entrepreneurs in Europe? In this article, we try to show that many of the rules that 
govern a company’s activities are not reliably determined according to the lex soci-
etatis across the EU. Not only do significant uncertainties exist with regard to the 
scope of the lex societatis, host states retain considerable power to interfere with the 
use of foreign company law concepts within their jurisdiction. In addition, Member 
States often have a choice between a range of functionally equivalent (or at least 
similar) legislative techniques to achieve a desired regulatory outcome. Where—as 
in the case of employee participation—significant scope for regulatory arbitrage 
may exist, Member States have chosen to remove the incentives for engaging in arbi-
trage through defensive harmonisation.
As a result, choosing what can reliably be considered to constitute company law 
in isolation, while remaining subject to a plethora of rules from adjacent and com-
peting areas of law, is likely to offer only very limited advantages to companies. This 
is particularly true for companies having their real seats in jurisdictions that rely 
extensively on insolvency and tort law to regulate corporate behaviour, as is the case 
for most of the largest EU economies. On the other hand, choosing to be governed 
by a foreign company law almost always increases the complexity and legal uncer-
tainty surrounding a company’s legal requirements. Outside of the much discussed, 
but ultimately arguably less important areas of minimum capital requirements and 
incorporation formalities for micro companies, these costs largely seem to have out-
weighed the modest benefits of choosing between Member States’ company laws. 
As there is little reason to believe that this situation will change in the foreseeable 
future, EU company law scholars may continue to be the group most affected by 
Centros and its progeny.
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